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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

STRUCTURE MATTERS: HOW ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
AFFECT MILITARY EFFORTS
Military organizations develop a unique set of practices and procedures in
response to their particular political, economic, and social circumstances. The
characteristics of these organizations shape standardized behaviors, methods of training
personnel, and the degree of stratification within their bureaucratic hierarchies. This
study examines how organizational characteristics influence battlefield effectiveness,
patterns of alliance formation, and the security of United Nations peacekeepers.
Chapter 2 evaluates how differences in personnel sophistication and bureaucratic
stratification influence battlefield efficacy. A military may devote substantial resources to
develop war plans and procure advanced technology, but these assets are of limited
consequence in the absence of personnel and a bureaucratic configuration capable of
translating political aims into military actions. Using battle-level data from the First
World War, I find that military organizations with stratified bureaucratic hierarchies and
relatively sophisticated personnel are significantly more effective on the battlefield.
Chapter 3 examines how characteristics of military organizations influence the
likelihood of alliance formation. Previous literature argues that a cooperative relationship
is essential for an alliance to form, but allied states must also coordinate military
activities in order to operate as a cohesive unit. Recognizing the extensive interplay
between cooperation and coordination, I contend that alliances form when states share
common interests and have military organizations capable of coordinating actions.
Through an analysis of alliance formation from 1816-2007, I find that states with similar
military organizations are significantly more likely to create security alliances.
Chapter 4 investigates how organizational traits of United Nations peacekeeping
coalitions influence the frequency and magnitude of deliberate attacks on peacekeepers.
Peacekeeping missions occur in unstable conflict environments, so effective collaboration
among peacekeepers is critical to achieve mandated objectives and protect UN personnel

drawn from harm. Operating as a cohesive unit presents a considerable challenge for
peacekeeping forces because they are ad hoc coalitions of contingents from a variety of
organizational cultures and professional backgrounds. Using annual data of UN
peacekeeping operations from 1990-2013, I find that peacekeeping coalitions sharing
similar organizational structures suffer fatalities at a significantly lower rate and
magnitude.
KEYWORDS: Military Organizations, Military Effectiveness, Alliance Formation,
Peacekeeping Operations
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Due to the anarchic nature of the international system, political leaders rely on a
military organization to promote domestic order and project power beyond state borders
(Huntington 1957; Feaver 1999; Tellis 2000). Despite sharing common goals, each
state’s armed forces develop unique practices and procedures in response to particular
political, economic, and social circumstances (Lewis and Roll 1990; Kadera 1998; Stam
1996).1 An abundance of literature examines how characteristics of the state, such as
regime type, economic development, and geography, contribute to military capabilities;
however, these studies often overlook traits of the military organization itself.
Organizational differences occur because the armed forces must be capable of
deterring foreign and domestic adversaries, while remaining receptive to the interests of
political leaders (Huntington 1957; Feaver 1999; Tellis 2000). Striking this balance
between aptitude and servitude is a difficult endeavor because overemphasis in either
direction can create dire consequences for the state. Specifically, a military that has
limited resources and lacks political support signals weakness to the international
community, which invites foreign aggression (Bland 1999; Feaver 1999). Likewise, a
military with unchecked power can develop into a “parasitic” organization that
undermines political leadership and directs resources away from the general public
(Bland 1999; Feaver 1999). Where a particular military falls along this spectrum
influences essential features of the military organization, including methods of training

1

Military organizations often have to settle for suboptimal methods that not only
compromise the ability to project power internationally, but also increase the risk of
casualties and overarching ineffectiveness in the theater of war (Biddle and Long 2004;
Kadera 1998; Reiter and Meek 1999; Stam 1996).
1

and mobilization, development of standardized behaviors, and capacity to collaborate
with other militaries (Fredrickson 1986; Millett et al. 1988; Soeters et al. 2010; Wilson
1989). This study investigates how characteristics of military organizations influence
battlefield effectiveness, patterns of alliance formation, and peacekeeper security.
Chapter 2 evaluates how dissimilarities in organizational characteristics
influenced battlefield effectiveness during the First World War. Organizational
characteristics not only affect methods of mobilizing personnel, proliferating weapons,
and developing strategies, but also change how a given military stratifies its bureaucratic
hierarchy. These differences are important to recognize because structure defines patterns
of intra-organizational relationships and institutes professional expectations for personnel
(Feaver 1999; Fredrickson 1986; Huntington 1957). A military may devote substantial
resources to develop war plans and procure advanced technology, but these assets are of
limited consequence in the absence of personnel and a bureaucratic configuration capable
of translating political aims into military actions (Hamilton and Herwig 2010; Millett et
al. 1986; Millett et al. 1988; Murray 2011).
While most studies of militarized conflict focus on the ultimate winners and losers
of a war, it is possible for the armed forces to be effective, even if they fall short of
victory (Brooks 2007; Millett et al. 1986). Specifically, an effective military is one that is
able to convert the resources at its disposal into an organization capable of conducting
operations against a broad range of adversaries (Brooks 2007; Tellis 2000). Because state
leaders tend to be sensitive to excessive economic and human losses (see Horowitz et al.
2011), an effective military organization is the one that achieves political aims with
limited costs in terms of blood and treasure. The First World War provides an ideal

2

setting for this evaluation because it is well-known event comprised of numerous battles
and involved participating militaries with considerable variation in organizational
structure. By evaluating the influence of organizational structures on individual battle
outcomes, this study offers novel insights for this historical case and indicates how
organizational traits can influence battlefield efficacy in contemporary war. Using battlelevel data from the First World War, I find that military organizations with stratified
bureaucratic hierarchies and relatively sophisticated personnel are significantly more
effective on the battlefield.
Chapter 3 examines how characteristics of military organizations influence the
likelihood of alliance formation. Previous literature suggests that states form security
alliances when they have similar domestic institutions, share foreign policy objectives, or
are facing a common enemy. Military alliances require elements of cooperation and
coordination in order to aggregate resources, conduct joint operations, and deter outside
aggressors.2 Cooperation occurs when states share common interests and adopt policies
that benefit at least one of the actors, while not making others worse off (Gulati et al.
2012). The possibility for cooperation is an essential trait when identifying a potential
alliance partner as state leaders are unlikely to pay the extensive costs created by formal
alliances unless signatories share common interests and approaches to international
problems. In order to translate mutual goals into action, alliance partners must also
coordinate a military action, which requires a deliberate and orderly adjustment of
practices and procedures to implement allied plans (Gulati et al. 2012).

2

Prior research suggests that alliances are most likely to deter outside aggression when
the partnership signals a high degree of cooperation and coordination to the rest of the
international system (Leeds and Anac 2005).
3

In the absence of perfect information, states partner with one another based on the
perception that their interests are compatible and that mutual gains can be achieved by
working together (Filson and Werner 2004; Keohane 2005; Reiter and Stam
2002;Weitsman 2003, 2014). Even if allies consider joint action as no more than a
temporary marriage of convenience (see Mearsheimer 2001), miscalculations of other
state’s attributes and capabilities may create a poor selection of military partners, which
could result in substantial material and human costs. Therefore, I theorize that allied
militaries that have comparable organizational traits require less of a learning curve to
reconcile their differences and work together effectively. Recognizing the roles of both
cooperation and coordination, I investigate patterns of alliance formation from 1816-2007
and find that states with similar military organizations are significantly more likely to
create security alliances. These results demonstrate that states evaluate the prospects of
both cooperation and coordination with potential allies before forming alliances. This
means that it is not enough for allies to agree on political and military objectives in a
broad sense, but they must also develop compatible organizational practices, standardized
procedures, and military acumen to execute joint operations.
Chapter 4 investigates how organizational traits of United Nations peacekeeping
coalitions influence the frequency and magnitude that belligerent actors deliberately
target peacekeepers with violence. Potential problems and pathologies found within state
military organizations are more acute within a coalition framework because a coalition is
an informal and temporary agreement for common action among states and partner states
rarely share the same overarching aims or methods to achieve their objectives (Silkett
1993). This places a considerable burden on military planners, who, while determining
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coalition objectives and strategies, must reconcile varying political interests in order to
achieve full unity of effort among the participating states (Morey 2015; Silkett 1993). In
the absence of ample time to evaluate the military capacity of partner states, engender
common practices, or coordinate joint operations, coalition forces have limited
opportunities to develop organizational trust or strategic unity that is necessary for
military success (Soeters et al. 2010; Weitsman 2003). Moreover, even if each member
state shares a common perspective on coalition objectives, reconciling differences in
organizational structure requires negotiation, experimentation, and time before effective
joint maneuvers can occur (Biddle 2004; Soeters et al. 2010).
If belligerents perceive a peacekeeping coalition as detrimental to their policy
objectives, they have incentives to purposefully and violently target peacekeepers in an
attempt to destabilize the operation and remove the foreign presence (Ruggeri et al. 2012;
Salverda 2013). A peacekeeping force that coordinates actions effectively is better able to
aggregate its resources and deter violent acts from hostile parties. On the other hand,
peacekeeping partners that are unable to work together or rapidly adapt to changing
circumstances risk being perceived as inept and may be incapable of quelling violence,
no matter how many “blue helmets” are involved (United Nations 2008). I theorize that
coalition partners that function under similar organizational structures are able to
collaborate and demonstrate the aptitude necessary to deter malicious violent attacks by
belligerent parties. Through the analysis of UN peacekeeping operations from 1990-2013,
I find that peacekeeping coalitions sharing similar organizational structures suffer
fatalities at a significantly lower rate and magnitude.

5

This project examines diverse cases and that cover different temporal periods in
order to identify the importance of organizational structure in a variety of military efforts.
Chapter 2 uses a micro-level approach to evaluate how differences in bureaucratic
stratification and personnel sophistication influence the battlefield efficacy of a given
military organization. This chapter outlines the mechanism of how differences in
organizational structure influences battlefield behavior, and in turn, affects the number of
personnel killed in action. Chapter 3 expands the scope to include all states from 18162007, and investigates how state leaders recognize the role of organizational structures
when choosing potential military allies. This chapter argues that state leaders recognize
the influence of organizational differences and strategically choose allies that can
cooperate politically and coordinate militarily. Chapter 4 focuses on organizational
development and investigates how security forces with different practices and procedures
work together within a coalition framework. Because the United Nations cannot
strategically select its personnel, structural differences among national contingents affect
the likelihood and magnitude of peacekeeper fatalities. This means that United Nations
leadership must consider organizational characteristics before constructing peacekeeping
operations and deploying personnel into a conflict zone
Because the concept of structure is multi-faceted, each chapter uses distinct
measures of organizational characteristics. In chapter 2, I evaluate organizations in terms
of bureaucratic stratification and personnel sophistication. These measures approximate
size of military command chain as well as the capacity of personnel within the
organization. In chapter 3, I consider the sophistication of personnel as well as the
societal role of the military as organizational features. These measures represent the
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proportion of the population involved in the military as well as their potential skill on the
battlefield. In chapter 4, I use the durability of the military organization to measure its
development of standard operating procedures. By capturing different aspects of military
organizations, these measures provide consistent support for the influence of
organizational structure on battlefield efficacy, alliance formation, and peacekeeper
security. These findings demonstrate that organizational structure matters, and that these
traits are not sensitive to a particular measure and are applicable to a number of military
efforts.
The present study challenges leading theories in international relations by
acknowledging idiosyncrasies among military organizations and examining the effect of
these characteristics on military efforts. Specifically, the realist/neorealist perspectives
along with the neoliberal school of thought tend to focus on attributes of the state and
continue to “black box” the armed forces.3 This decision glosses over that military
organizations are distinct entities, minimizes that military organizations are microcosms
of the societies they serve in terms of professional norms and initiative on the battlefield
(Millet et al. 1986, 1988; Murray 2011; Reiter 2007; Reiter and Stam 2002; Soeters et al.
2010). Therefore, this project intends to identify key characteristics of military
organizations and explain how these traits influence military efficacy on the battlefield,
the likelihood of alliance partnerships, and personnel security within peacekeeping
coalitions.

3

Neorealists simplify military organizations to the greatest degree by conceptualizing the
state a unitary actor (Measheimer 2001; Waltz 1979). While neoliberals recognize the
influence of subnational and transnational factors to the development of state institutions,
it does not address explicitly differences in the armed forces or the impact of these
differences.
7
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Chapter 2: Military Efficacy in the First World War
A series of conflicts involving territory, spheres of influence, and military
supremacy plagued Europe during the early years of the 20th Century.4 These clashes set
the stage for a large-scale war by encouraging military alignments across the continent,
such as the entente between Russia and France and the alliance between Germany and
Austria-Hungary, along with arms races among competing states (Kennedy 1984;
Tierney 2011; Van Evera 1985). Tensions between these factions reached a violent
crescendo with the assassination of the Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the
summer of 1914 (Williamson 2011). Germany elected to support its ally in a military
response against Serbia despite concluding that this would likely draw additional states
into the fray, and could even result in a two-front war (Lieber 2007; Tierney 2011).
Despite considerable military and industrial disadvantages when compared to their
adversaries, war still became the selected course of action for the Central Powers
(Hamilton and Herwig 2010; Kennedy 1984; Williamson 2011).
More than a century after the July Crisis, scholars continue to investigate why the
Central Powers took a gamble for military victory and how this decision escalated into
one of the bloodiest conflicts in modern history (Levy 2011; Snyder 1984; Tierney 2011;
Van Evera 1984, 1985; Vasquez et al. 2011). Previous literature identifies adherence to
offensive military doctrine (Snyder 1984; Stam 1996; Van Evera 1984), domestic
political conditions (Shimshoni 1990-1991; Reiter and Stam 2002), and complex alliance

4

These conflicts included the Russo-Japanese War, the First and Second Moroccan
Crises, the First and Second Balkan Wars, and a naval arms race between Germany and
the United Kingdom. There were also a number of disputes that included a near AustroRussian war in the winter of 1912-1913, two near Austro-Serbian military clashes, and a
German-Russian crisis over advisers in Constantinople (Williamson 2011).
9

ties (Weitsman 2003, 2014; Williamson 2011) as potential factors behind the
development and outcome of World War I. While these explanations are informative,
existing research does not detail how traits of each military organization influenced
differences battlefield performance.
Most political leaders charge their military organizations with the defense of the
state and its interests, but idiosyncrasies within states determine the amount of resources
and responsibilities granted to the military, which in turn changes how a given military
structures its organization. These differences are important to recognize because structure
defines patterns of intra-organizational relationships and institutes professional
expectations for personnel (Feaver 1999; Fredrickson 1986; Huntington 1957). A military
may devote substantial resources to develop war plans and procure advanced technology,
but these assets are of limited consequence in the absence of personnel and a bureaucratic
structure capable of translating political aims into military actions (Hamilton and Herwig
2010; Millett et al. 1986, 1988; Murray 2011). The present study concludes that the
bureaucratic design of the military as well as the sophistication of its personnel
significantly shaped the battlefield performance of World War I participants. This finding
indicates that political decisions regarding the allotment of resources to the armed forces
and the stratification of authority within its ranks influence how effectively military
personnel perform on the field of battle.
This chapter begins by introducing prior literature on conflict outcomes and
discussing how these connect to existing explanations of events in the First World War.
Second, I examine the structure of military organizations and discuss how professional
attributes of personnel along with bureaucratic design determine how decisions are made

10

and how troops respond to changing circumstances in conflict. Next, I develop a
theoretical explanation of how differences in structure critically influence military
efficacy on the battlefield. Then, I use statistical analyses to identify how organizational
structure factored into battle outcomes in World War I. I conclude by integrating
organizational structures into explanations for the development and outcome of the First
World War and considering how variation in organizational structures affect battlefield
efficacy in both unilateral and multilateral military efforts.
Conventional Wisdom about the Great War
Among the explanations for the initiation, escalation, and outcome of World War
I, numerous scholars contend that offensive doctrines dominated military organizations of
belligerent states. This “cult of the offensive” emerged because military professionals
were fighting for the societal position of the armed forces and argued that aggressive
military solutions were the best method to reach political objectives (Snyder 1984; Van
Evera 1984, 1985). As a result, military leaders emphasized an active role for the defense
apparatus in order to obtain a greater share of state resources and maintain relevance
among other government agencies.5 An attempt to preserve the professional nature of the
military was evident in France where political pressures to shorten the tenure of military
service caused the armed forces to fear for the traditions of their organization (Snyder
1984; Van Evera 1985). To ensure the survival of the armed forces, many military
officials began promoting the merits of offensive actions, which they argued could only
be performed by well-trained, active-duty troops (Sagan 1986; Snyder 1984; Van Evera

5

States operate with a finite amount of distributable goods, so a continual competition for
resources emerges between the military and other government agencies to maintain
organizational relevance and vitality (Allison 1971; Barnett and Finnemore 2004).
11

1985). As a bureaucratic organization, this bias toward offensive actions spread through
the chain of command in order to create a clear organizational mission for all military
personnel to follow.6
Beyond doctrine, influence of standardized organizational behavior was evident in
terms of mobilizing military personnel. After political and military leaders decided to
begin war preparations, the mobilization “machines” had too much bureaucratic inertia to
stop once activated (Trachtenberg 1990-1991; Sagan 1986). In other words, orders to
mobilize the armed forces served as a tipping point, from which the state could not back
down. Scholars contend that the decision to mobilize spurred a security dilemma across
Europe, creating a chain-reaction of arming and military preparation (Levy 1990-1991;
Trachtenberg 1990-1991). Snyder (1984: 119) recognizes the power of organizational
momentum when stating,
Organizations like to work according to a plan that ties together the
standard operating procedures of all the subunits into a prepackaged script.
So that they can stick to this script at all costs, organizations try to
dominate their environment rather than react to it. Reacting to
unpredictable circumstances means throwing out the plan, improvising,
and perhaps even deviating from standard operating procedures.
While some decisions can be credited to organizational inertia, it was in the hands of
military leaders to develop specific strategies and war plans that would overpower the
adversary (Shimshoni 1990-1991). The string of European conflicts in the early 20th

6

Some scholars challenge the dominance of offensive doctrine, noting that military
leaders can justify aggressive military force through either offensive or defensive
doctrine (Leiber 2007; Sagan 1986).
12

century encouraged states to act as coalitions instead of relying on unilateral action.
Political tensions alongside the complex alliance commitments increased both the
probability and magnitude of the First World War (Tierney 2011; Vasquez et al. 2011).
These extensive alliance ties emboldened state leaders to engage in aggressive action,
with states under the impression their allies would provide military support if necessary
(Pressman 2008; Stevenson 2011; Tierney 2011).7 For example, Austria-Hungary
understood that Germany would provide its assistance if the war were to draw in a third
party, which motivated the decisions to send an ultimatum to Serbia and eventually elect
to initiate war against Russia (Levy 2011). In the absence of the strong alliance
agreement, and Germany’s “blank check” support, the Dual Monarchy may not have
pursued such an aggressive policy (Levy 2011; Tierney 2011; Williamson 2011). Many
scholars argue that Austria-Hungary’s decision led to an immediate escalation of conflict
by activating agreements between Russia and France, and eventually Great Britain
(Tierney 2011; Williamson 2011).
It is possible that alliance commitments led to the entrapment of major European
powers, but these agreements were not comprehensive and did not involve all members
of the respective coalitions. Leeds et al. (2000) indicate that scholars should not treat all
alliances in the same manner because the specific terms of an agreement have a
substantial impact on decision-making. For instance, the formal agreement between Great
Britain and France simply entailed a lack of fighting over colonial claims, but contained

Scholars refer to these types of relationships as “chain-gang alliances” (Pressman 2008;
Tierney 2011). For example, Lieber (2007) argues that Germany chose to provoke a
major conflict as a way to capitalize on its waning power advantage. This was a viable
strategy because alliance commitments would bring Austria-Hungary into the fray
(Kennedy 1984).
7
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no promise of military coordination in the event of war (Leeds et al. 2002). Moreover,
rather than creating alliance networks that tied all of these states into a collective security
system, these coalitions were comprised of a number of bilateral agreements (Chong and
Hall 2014; Tierney 2011; Williamson 2011). Instead of creating a single, multilateral
alliance, each pair of states established a unique degree of commitment, and in many
cases alliance terms did not include provisions for military preparation or assistance.
When considering military doctrine and the accumulation of capabilities through
alliances, the Central Powers lacked a military advantage at the start of the First World
War.8 The Entente outnumbered their adversaries in terms of population and military
personnel, while also exhibiting superior manufacturing and heavy industrial capabilities
(Kennedy 1984). Nevertheless, the absence of central planning or a combined staff, along
with minimal interstate communication, inhibited the Entente from developing a common
allied strategy or cohesion on the battlefield until the latter stages of the war (Hamilton
and Herwig 2010; Millett et al. 1986, 1988).9 In contrast, Germany and Austria-Hungary
formed a solid territorial bloc, established an infrastructure for interstate communication,
and benefited from the superior fighting qualities of German soldiers (Hamilton and
Herwig 2010; Kennedy 1984; Tierney 2011). Considering the vast differences in
resources, it is puzzling as to why the Central Power elected for war. The answer to this

8

The alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary had an initial advantage in terms of
manufacturing and heavy industry, but lost this lead after Great Britain entered the
conflict in August 1914 (Kennedy 1984).
9
The British and French armies eventually created a supreme allied commander who
could construct a grand strategy for the allies, but only after Germany made substantial
offensive gains in March 1918 (Millett et al. 1988).
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question may be found by examining the relative efficacy of each participating military.
This notion is supported by Brooks (2007a: 3) who explains,
Resources are important in assessing potential power, but effectiveness
tells how well a state can translate those resources into actual power in
war. Effectiveness is the difference between what a state’s raw resources
suggest it could potentially do, and what it is actually capable of doing in
battle.
Rather than focusing on the outcome of the war, it is beneficial to examine the
performances of each belligerent state on the battlefield. While the results of a war are
instructive, they aggregate information from individual battles and gloss over the specific
contributions of each participant to the overarching war effort. Using a lower level of
analysis makes it possible to examine the idiosyncrasies of each military organization and
evaluate their respective ability to transform resources into military assets and implement
these assets in conflict.
Characteristics of Military Organizations
As the coercive arm of the state, the military must be equipped to defend the
population from foreign and domestic adversaries while also being attentive and
receptive to the interests of political state managers (Feaver 1999; Huntington 1957;
Tellis 2000). This means that members of the armed forces seek access to necessary
technologies, such as rifles and artillery, while also learning advanced techniques to
employ these assets, but are constrained by the share of resources and responsibilities
allotted to them by the government (Brooks 2007b; Feaver 1999; Horowitz 2011;
Huntington 1957). State leaders determine the level of investment in the military by
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assessing the salience of present threats and considering if the armed forces are
appropriate to overcome these challenges (Feaver 1999; Tellis 2000).10 The share of
resources dedicated to the military not only shapes the proliferation of weapons systems,
but also methods of training personnel (Brooks 2007b; Burk 2001; Huntington 1957;
Tellis 2000).
While the budget and total size of a military indicates the potential power a state
could elicit to conduct a war, resources alone do not predict military effectiveness (Tellis
2000). Previous research suggests that an effective military is one that can transform raw
materials into an organization capable of conducting operations against a variety of
adversaries (Brooks 2007a; Millett et al. 1986; Tellis 2000). To become an effective
organization, a military must be able to utilize its available resources and create strategies
that can diffuse its opponents’ capabilities (Brooks 2007a). This trait carries over to
individual personnel, who develop skill and quality by learning how to exploit
opportunities on the battlefield (Brooks 2007a). In order for personnel to cultivate these
abilities, leaders should prioritize the training and equipping of individual personnel, so
that they are able to integrate military hardware, labor, and other supporting assets
appropriately (Reiter and Stam 1998, 2002; Tellis 2000). Put differently, militaries that
prepare individual personnel to take initiative, display leadership in battle, and utilize
logistical technologies are more likely to have sophisticated troops capable of performing
effectively on the battlefield (Reiter and Stam 1998; 2002; Szayna et al. 2001)

Huntington (1957: 65) notes that, “the causes of war are always political. State policy
aimed at continuing political objectives precedes war, determines the resort to war,
dictates the nature of the war, concludes the war, and continues after the war”.
10
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Hypothesis 1: As military personnel become more sophisticated, a military organization
will perform more effectively on the battlefield.
The preparation and execution of war requires coordinating actions among a large
number of personnel, so militaries often use bureaucratic hierarchies to “replace the
uncertain expectations and haphazard activities of voluntary endeavors with the stability
and routine of organized relationships” (Wilson 1989, 221).11 The bureaucratic design
shapes means of command and control by defining the internal pattern of relationships,
shaping perceptions and respect for authority, and establishing norms of communication
among different positions (Millett et al. 1988; Soeters et al. 2010; Wilson 1989).12 To
foster support and obedience for the hierarchy of command, military organizations rely
on standard operating procedures (SOPs) and rules of engagement (ROEs) to codify
acceptable actions and behaviors (Wilson 1989). Military organizations commonly
engender standardized practices and procedures through “drills and skills,” which train
service members to execute certain actions in an instinctual manner, even when under
immense amounts of stress (Soeters et al. 2010).
Despite fervent emphasis on establishing predictable behavior, opportunities for
deviant action emerge because sanctioned policies simply do not exist for all situations
(Avant 2007; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). As a result, high-ranking officials (i.e.,
principals) disseminate general information and vague strategic objectives, but rarely
specify the means by which these goals must be accomplished (Barnett and Finnemore
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A military bureaucracy achieves organizational efficiency through institutionalizing
rational, technocratic control embedded within a clearly defined command structure
(Adler and Borys 1996; Aoki 1986; Fredrickson 1986; Glenn 2011; Soeters et al. 2010).
12
Scholars also refer to these characteristics as measures of organizational structure
(Fredrickson 1986; Soeters et al. 2010; Wilson 1989).
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2004; Wilson 1989). Some leaders may attempt to micro-manage decisions throughout
the chain of command, but are often inclined to trust the expertise and motives of
subordinates (i.e. agents) and in turn allow lower-ranking officials to exercise varying
degrees of decision-making authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: Wilson 1989). Each
division in the bureaucratic hierarchy represents a “zone of discretion” in which
personnel have an opportunity to act as information editors and develop self-serving
policies in response to a single set of orders (Avant 2007; Barnett and Finnemore 2004).
In addition to establishing standards of behavior, the distribution of decisionmaking authority in a bureaucracy influences how they prepare their approach for the
battlefield. Prior research indicates that there are two ideal types of bureaucratic designs:
coercive and enabling (Adler and Borys 1996). Coercive bureaucracies emphasize the
need to formalize and codify acceptable behaviors and centralize decision-making
authority to the heights of the chain of command (Adler and Borys 1996; Wilson 1989).
This hierarchical design creates compliance among the rank-and-file by punishing those
that shirk assigned responsibilities or deviate from their assigned tasks (Adler and Broys
1996; Soeters et al. 2010; Wilson 1989). A military that subscribes to the coercive
structure finds optimal efficacy through the institutionalization of rational, technocratic
control embedded within a clearly defined command structure and strict adherence to
standard operating procedures (Adler and Borys 1996; Aoki 1986; Fredrickson 1986;
Glenn 2011; Soeters et al. 2010). Because this structure requires personnel to refer
routine decisions to the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy, means of communication can
become sluggish, assessments delayed, and decisions rashly made, all of which can result
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in unnecessary costs of blood and treasure (Adler and Borys 1996; Aoki 1986; Kotter
2014; Wilson 1989).
In contrast, enabling bureaucracies encourage responses to evolving situations
through use of “on-the-spot” knowledge and problem solving by individuals, rather than
micro-management by superiors (Adler and Borys 1996; Aoki 1986; Soeters et al. 2010).
This type of structure recognizes that effective strategizing by high-level officials is
important, but is contingent on the abilities of those dealing directly with the peculiarities
on the ground (Brooks 2007b; Murray 2011; Soeters et al. 2010). Enabling organizations
also encourage personnel to embrace new ideas and innovations even if doing so
fundamentally changes institutional norms and practices (Adler and Borys 1996; Aoki
1986; Huntington 1957). Through the diffusion of knowledge and the decentralization of
planning responsibilities, personnel at each link in the chain of command have an
opportunity to use discretion, which allows for those on the battlefield to respond
immediately to a changing conflict environment (Aoki 1986; Brooks 2007b; Soeters et al.
2010).
These archetypes illustrate that when it comes to bureaucratic design, militaries
that establish rigid command structures and highly compartmentalized divisions of labor
are less likely to display the skills necessary to employ weapons and technology
effectively (Tellis 2000). This logic assumes that personnel only show initiative when
given authority to use discretion, and that adaptation typically produces favorable
outcomes. While this is the conventional wisdom toward bureaucratic design, restricting
discretionary action can provide the predictability needed for personnel to develop
expertise in their specific position (Adler and Borys 1996; Aoki 1986; Fredrickson 1986).
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When organizations formalize bureaucratic positions and personnel have a clear sense of
their role, they are often more satisfied with their work and demonstrate commitment to
the organization (Adler and Borys).13 Because formalizing bureaucratic roles reduces
ambiguity of a soldier’s responsibilities to the war effort, I expect that increasing the
division of labor will lead to improved military efficacy on the battlefield.
Hypothesis 2: As the bureaucratic hierarchy becomes more stratified, a military
organization will perform more effectively on the battlefield.
The sophistication of military personnel and bureaucratic design can influence
military efficacy independently, but the combination of these organizational traits also
affect battlefield performance. In other words, the formalization of specific roles must be
matched with an appropriate level of troop quality (Frederickson 1986; Soeters et al.
2010; Wilson 1989). Militaries that utilize a coercive structure and encourage expertise
require personnel with the skills necessary to capitalize on their differentiated roles.
Likewise, military organizations that train personnel to have generalized knowledge
operate more effectively when responsibilities are defined relatively ambiguously and
roles are less stratified. Because an effective organization is one capable of transforming
raw materials into action, sophisticated personnel operating within a coercive
bureaucratic design should achieve a high level of military effectiveness.
Hypothesis 3: As bureaucratic stratification increases, sophisticated personnel will
achieve greater battlefield effectiveness.

13

A number of studies have found that formalizing specific roles and responsibilities
allow workers to feel more satisfied and less alienated from the larger organization (see
Jackson and Schuler 1995; Michaels et al. 1988; Stevens et al. 1992).
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The influence of organizational characteristics on military effectiveness becomes
apparent when examining the Central Powers in World War I. Prior to the outbreak of
war, much of Europe considered the German armed forces as the most capable and
professionalized military organization on the continent (Hamilton and Herwig 2010;
Kennedy 1985; Millett et al. 1986, 1988).14 A notable feature of the German military was
its strict root-and-branch bureaucratic structure, which clearly defined roles and
responsibilities for each member within the chain of command. This structure worked
well for German military officials who were able to develop institutional practices and
war plans under the auspices of a consistent pool of resources and were sheltered from
substantial political interference (Hamilton and Herwig 2010). As the conflict drew near,
the Austro-Hungarian military sought to emulate its German counterpart by proposing
extensive organizational reforms and abandoning its own plans for battle (Hamilton and
Herwig 2010). Despite these efforts, substantial differences remained because political
leaders in the Dual Monarchy maintained considerable influence over the armed forces,
forcing the military to operate with restricted access to vital material resources and
limited opportunities to develop military expertise (Hamilton and Herwig 2010).
Although Austria-Hungary sought a bureaucratic design similar to that of its ally, their
personnel lacked the capability and skillset needed to operate effectively in such an
organizational setting.

Hamilton and Herwig (2010: 36) note that “since the wars of German unification, the
Reich was perceived to be the strongest military power on the continent, with reliable,
well-trained troops, a first-class officer corps, and the most professional General Staff in
Europe”.
14
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This example demonstrates that militaries with different organizational structures
prepare dissimilar responses to the same stimuli: either approach it with traditional
actions or develop new procedures based on the particular situation (Aoki 1989; Adler
and Borys 1996; Wilson 1989). The German military exemplified a centralized
organizational structure: it emphasized the need for a clear stratification of authority and
relied on standard operating procedures to direct actions and behaviors of its members.
This coercive bureaucratic design prohibited personnel from taking discretionary action,
but it also allowed individuals to develop expertise in a particular combat role. In
essence, the German military sacrificed the ability for organization-wide flexibility in
order to foster task specialization among its personnel. On the other hand, the AustroHungarian military utilized a similar bureaucratic design, but its personnel lacked the
sophistication necessary to carry out complex battle plans on the ground. These
organizational traits as well as the respective combinations of personnel sophistication
and bureaucratic design explain the vast difference in military efficiency demonstrated by
these allies.
Research Design
In order to evaluate military effectiveness of World War I participants, I use battle
data from the United States Army’s CDB90 dataset (Dupuy 1995).15 Each observation in
the data accounts for a battle in a dyadic format with combatants categorized as attacker
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Scholars criticized the original dataset for double counting battles by including an
observation for a battle while also accounting for clashes that were part of the larger
operation (see Biddle 2004; Ramsay 2008). To account for this, I use a version of the data
revised by Biddle and Long (2004) where duplicate battles have been removed.
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or defender.16 While World War I involved a number of states acting as part of broad
alignments, observing battles in this fashion still represents behavior in warfare. As noted
by Reiter and Stam (2002, 39) ‘‘decision makers rarely anticipate or think in terms of
larger systems of wars, but instead usually think in terms of sequences of opponents.”
Therefore, I use a battle-dyad as the unit of analysis. Scholars have criticized this data
previously for selection bias because of its focus on conflicts involving Europe and the
United States (Ramsay 2008). Because this study only evaluates battles from the First
World War, selection effects in terms of the battles should not systematically bias present
findings. I present the role of war participants in Table 2.1 below.
[Table 2.1 about here]
Dependent Variable
The primary objective of a military campaign is to defeat the enemy in combat,
which means military organizations can pursue this objective effectively, even if they do
not achieve ultimate victory in war (Biddle 2007; Brooks 2007a; Millett et al. 1986,
1988). Although effective military organizations may have a greater chance of long-term
success, effectiveness is not necessarily synonymous with winning a war. Put simply,
efficacy is determined by how one military performs compared to its opponent. In order
to evaluate the relative efficacy of war participants, I evaluate the performance of military
organizations during individual battles. Specifically, I focus on the number of battlefield
losses of each military organization.17 Using battle casualties is appropriate because
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There are rare occasions when multiple states are involved in a battle, but only a single
actor is designated as an attacker or defender. Rather than exclude these cases, I use a
control variable to account for multilateral action (see below).
17
This is consistent with Soeters et al. (2010: 207) who states, “Effectiveness has
traditionally been measured in terms of outputs. In the past, these output measures have
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losses of military personnel not only limit feasible military strategies, but also serve as an
indicator of military (in)competence (Biddle 2007; Biddle and Long 2004; Dixon 1976).
To measure the relative effectiveness of participating militaries, I use the loss exchange
ratio (LER), which is calculated as the proportion of attacker casualties to total attacker
and defender battle deaths. Because LER is a proportion, its values are comparable across
cases despite differences in the magnitude of battle casualties (Biddle and Long 2004).18
Independent Variables
Although there is no perfect measure to assess the sophistication of military
personnel, the share of government resources devoted to the average soldier can influence
the capacity of a military on the battlefield (Brooks 2007b; Reiter and Stam 2002; Szayna
et al. 2001). Specifically, a military can enhance the capacity of its armed forces by
investing in advanced training methods and technology. Prior studies argue that the rate
of per soldier spending indicates the type of technology, equipment, and training
programs available to military personnel (Reiter and Stam 2002).19 Following the
practices in previous research, I divide total military expenditures by the number of
military personnel to measure the sophistication of the armed forces (Powell 2012; Reiter

been the military actions taken (e.g. the ‘body count’ and the number of targets
destroyed).”
18
This measure is also free of subjective coding of battle “victory” and “defeat” (see
Biddle and Long 2004).
19
Some scholars contend that per soldier spending does not accurately represent
personnel sophistication (Biddle and Long 2004; Powell 2012). These researchers
suggest that this measure cannot account for areas military spending is actually dedicated
(Biddle and Long 2004) or variation in spending occurring due to regime type (Powell
2012). Although it is possible for state leaders to overspend on the military, or unwisely
invest in inefficient technologies and corrupt personnel, several studies conclude that
militaries with higher per soldier spending typically do demonstrate superior troop
quality (Reiter and Stam 2002; Szayna et al. 2001).
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and Stam 2002; Szayna et al. 2001). I create the variable Sophistication, which calculates
the proportion of attacker per soldier spending to the total of attacker and defender per
soldier spending for each dyad-year. Therefore, the Sophistication measure does not
indicate personnel quality in absolute terms, but rather the sophistication of personnel
compared to the quality of its adversary. I compile military personnel, military
expenditure, and total population figures from version 4.0 of the Correlates of War
National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer 1987).20 I present the descriptive statistics
for Sophistication and all other variables used in the statistical analyses in Table 2.2
below.
[Table 2.2 about here]
The bureaucratic design of a military organization is crucial to its performance on
the battlefield because it shapes the internal pattern of relationships, establishes roles of
specialization, and determines the manner of communication through the command chain
(Fredrickson 1986; Soeters et al. 2010; Wilson 1989). Specifically, the division of labor
within a bureaucratic hierarchy indicates the clarity of specific roles and the emphasis on
task specialization (Adler and Borys 1996; Soeters et al. 2010; Wilson 1989). Once
again, there is not an ideal measure of bureaucratic design, so I elect to measure
bureaucratic hierarchies in terms of the number of ranked positions in each army.21 The
number of military ranks represents a crude and highly simplified approximation, but
these figures allow for cross-national comparison and capture formal designations of
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I replace missing military personnel or expenditure data using the most recent year
with data.
21
Horowitz (2011) emphasizes the myriad of differences between military organizations,
and explains that the presence of such minutia has limited research in this area.
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specific roles and responsibilities within the organization. For example, ranks indicate
vertical divisions of a principal and its subordinate, like the relationship between a major
and a captain, as well as horizontal divisions such as a general of artillery and general of
infantry. To measure the influence of bureaucracy, I create a variable Stratification that
calculates the proportion of attacker ranks to total attacker and defender ranks in a battle
dyad. This variable does not indicate the influence of bureaucracy in absolute terms, but
instead indicates relative differences in bureaucratic design. I collect the number of army
ranks from a database compiled by Over the Front historical magazine (Bennett 2013)
and present military ranks for each war participant in Table 2.3 below.
[Table 2.3 about here]
Control Variables
The magnitude of battlefield losses may not be a testament to military efficacy,
but rather an artifact of the number personnel available for a particular conflict. In other
words, as states commit more personnel for combat, they provide more potential targets
on the battlefield. To account for this, I calculate the number of military personnel for
each battle-dyad by calculating the proportion of attacker personnel to the total of
attacker and defender personnel. I derive personnel figures for attacker and defender
militaries from the CDB90 dataset (Dupuy 1995) modified by Biddle and Long (2004).22

22

I also collected the number of mobilized military personnel as reported in The Harper
Encyclopedia of Military History (Dupuy and Dupuy 1993) and The World War I
Databook (Ellis and Cox 2001). The number of mobilized personnel is highly correlated
with the number of total personnel as compiled by version 4.0 of the National Material
Capabilities dataset (Singer et al. 1972). I select to use personnel figures in the CBD90
dataset because substituting personnel counts from other sources does not change the
statistical or substantive results of the models.
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Prior studies argue that political culture and social values associated with
democracies are associated with battlefield effectiveness and lower numbers of battlefield
losses (Horowitz et al. 2011; Reiter and Stam 2002). Moreover, scholars contend that
democratic states demonstrate high levels of efficacy on the battlefield and suffer
significantly fewer casualties as a result (Horowitz et al. 2011; Reiter and Stam 2002). To
evaluate the influence of regime, I create a variable Democracy, which is the proportion
of the attacker’s democracy score to the total attacker and defender democracy score. I
derive democracy scores from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2014).23 Greater
values of this variable indicate an increasingly democratic attacker in a battle-dyad.
Previous literature indicates that the educational attainment of citizens are key to
fielding militaries capable of operating sophisticated weapons and implement complex
operations (Biddle and Long 2004; Biddle and Zirkle 1996). To measure the intellectual
capabilities of a state’s population, I create a variable that represents the attacker’s
fraction of the sum of attacker and defender states’ years of primary and secondary
education per capita. These values account for educational attainment in the year prior to
the outbreak of war. I collect education from the modified CDB90 dataset (Biddle and
Long 2004; Dupuy 1995).
The amount of time states are involved in a conflict also contributes to the
number of battlefield losses. Put simply, each day troops are on the battlefield they are at
risk of becoming a casualty (Horowitz et al. 2011). Therefore, states that engage in
lengthy battles the longest are more likely to experience higher battlefield losses. I create
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Democracy values are on a scale from 0 to 10 (Marshall et al. 2014). I assign
democracy scores based on the year of the battle.
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a variable that measures the number of days each battle. I collect battle duration
information from the CDB90 (Dupuy 1995) dataset modified by Biddle and Long (2004).
The number of states involved in a given battle also influences battlefield
outcomes. Specifically, most analyses of the World War I describe the conflict between
two broad military alignments. Although states form military coalitions as a way to
address a common threat, such an alignment does not preclude partner states from
developing their own goals and strategies (Glenn 2011; Silkett 1993). Moreover, there are
limited occasions when allied states actually fought alongside each other on a single
battlefield. Nevertheless, I account for multilateral efforts in battle by creating a
dichotomous variable coded as 1 when the attacker is a coalition and 0 otherwise.24 I
derive information about the origin of battle combatants from the modified CDB90
dataset (Biddle and Long 2004; Dupuy 1995).
Statistical Model
Because the dependent variable is a proportion, I analyze the data using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression. The OLS approach fits a model to the observed data in
the form of a straight line that minimizes the sum of squared vertical distances (LewisBeck 1980). To account for potential heteroscedasticity, I use robust standard errors. I
also present predicted probabilities to illustrate the substantive effect of Sophistication
and Stratification on battlefield effectiveness.
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In the data, there are only four observations where an attacker operates as part of a
coalition. While this is less than 5 percent of the data, it is theoretically important to
distinguish when military efforts are unilateral and multilateral in nature. The inclusion of
this control does not alter the significance or direction of other variables, but is itself
statistically significant (see Table 2.4).
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A recent study argues that OLS may not be appropriate when the dependent
variable is a proportion because this method can create “nonsensical predications for
extreme values of the regressors” (Baum 2008, 299). To address this concern I also
conduct analyses using generalized linear modeling (GLM) techniques.25 The GLM
models do not produce results that differ statistically or substantively from OLS models,
so I select to present the latter due to simplicity of interpreting results. I include
generalized linear models as well as marginal effects graphs of these models in the
Appendix.
[Table 2.4 about here]
Results and Discussion
The OLS regression models in Table 2.4 include unconditional and conditional
relationships between organizational characteristics and military effectiveness. Based on
the results of Model 3, the sophistication of military personnel considerably influences
military effectiveness in battle. Specifically, for each unit increase in the attacker’s
proportion of Sophistication, attackers experience a 27 percent decrease in their
proportion of battlefield casualties on average.26 This finding suggests that militaries with
an advantage over their opponent in terms of personnel quality will operate with more
efficacy in battle, which supports Hypothesis 1. This proposition is also consistent with
previous research that discusses how military skill influences the number of battlefield
casualties. Biddle (2007: 208) acknowledges this relationship when stating,
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The generalized linear model uses the logit link function and binomial distribution as
suggested by Baum (2008).
26
I first focus on Model 3 because it includes all control variables and excludes the
interaction terms, so the coefficients of Sophistication and Stratification can be
interpreted directly.
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As weapons have become more lethal, unskilled militaries’ casualty rates
have grown rapidly. The net result has been a growing gap between the
casualty rates of skilled militaries and those of unskilled militaries over
time: technology has acted as a wedge that drives apart the real military
power of the skilled and of the inept, but with much less effect on the
outcomes of wars between the highly skilled.
Figure 2.1 presents the marginal effect of Sophistication and indicates that an increasing
advantage in troop quality creates a substantial decrease in the proportion of attacker
personnel killed in battle. In this figure, the x-axis represents the range of the
Sophistication measure and the y-axis indicates the predicted proportion of battlefield
losses suffered by the attacker. Looking at Figure 2.1, attackers with the largest
advantage of Sophistication are predicted to experience a Loss Exchange Ratio of 40
percent, while attacking militaries with comparatively low Sophistication are expected to
account for nearly 67 percent of the battle’s casualties. For example, in the battle at
Tannenberg (1914), the Sophistication measure for the German attackers and Russian
defender is 0.761. This indicates that Germany outspent their Russian counterparts per
soldier at a rate of 3 to 1. Such an advantage in troop quality allowed Germany to
conclude with less than 10 percent of the battle’s casualties.
[Figure 2.1 about here]
Model 3 also indicates that the bureaucratic design affects battlefield
effectiveness. On average, for each unit increase in the attacker’s proportion of
Stratification the attacker experiences nearly a 75 percent reduction in LER. This finding
suggests that war participants were much more efficient on the battlefield when utilizing
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many layers of command and control (i.e. ranked positions), which supports the
relationship proposed in Hypothesis 2. It is interesting to note that Stratification does not
reach statistical significance in Models 1 and 2. This indicates that the influence of
bureaucratic design is not apparent unless other state and battle-level variables are also
included. That being said, increasing “links” in the command chain can potentially limit
the organization’s flexibility to a changing wartime environment. Nevertheless, an
organization that remains true to standard operating procedures maintains a degree
predictability during chaotic situations, and this benefits the mental health and
capabilities of military personnel (Millett et al. 1986; Murray 2011; Soeters et al. 2010).
[Figure 2.2 about here]
Figure 2.2 presents the marginal effect of Stratification and indicates a substantial
decrease in attacker’s LER as the attacker has a greater proportion of ranked positions. In
this figure, the x-axis represents the range of the Stratification measure and the y-axis
indicates the proportion of battlefield casualties experienced by the attacking military.
Based on Figure 2.2, an attacker with the largest advantage in terms of Stratification are
expected to experience an LER of roughly 11 percent, while attacking militaries with the
lowest proportion of ranked positions account for more than 85 percent of the battle’s
casualties. It is important to note that as Stratification approaches 0.5, belligerents can
expect to bear a near equal share of casualties.
[Figure 2.3 about here]
While it is important to consider the independent influence of organizational traits
on battlefield efficacy, the combination of these elements also affect how militaries
perform in battle. At first glance, the conditional relationship proposed in Hypothesis 3 is
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not supported because the interaction term does not reach statistical significance. This is
not surprising when considering that the results in Model 4 indicate the influence of
Sophistication on LER when the value of Stratification is zero (Brambor et al. 2006).
Because the proportion of bureaucracies is never zero, the OLS results are not
particularly informative. To elucidate potential substantive influence of this interaction, I
plot marginal effects of the interaction term. Looking at Figure 2.3, the predicted
proportion of battlefield casualties decreases as Sophistication rises regardless of the
attacker’s share of Stratification. This figure also illustrates that a military is expected to
lose the larger proportion of the battlefield when it lags behind an opponent in terms of
personnel sophistication and bureaucratic stratification.
[Figure 2.4 about here]
To evaluate this relationship in another way, I present Figure 2.4 which shows
predicted probabilities of LER when belligerents have an even share of Stratification, but
differ in terms of Sophistication. Based on this figure, conditions under which
Sophistication and Stratification have a significant effect on the loss exchange ratio when
the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are both above (or below) the 0.5
line (Brambor et al 2006).27 Thus, when belligerents share similar bureaucratic
stratification but the attacker has a 0.2 of Sophistication, an attacker is predicted to
experience 58 percent of a battle’s casualties. In contrast, when the attacking military
accounts for 0.8 of the dyad’s Sophistication, it can expect to experience less than 42
percent of the battle’s casualties.
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The 0.5 line represents the null hypothesis in which sophistication and stratification
have no effect on battlefield casualties.
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This impact of battlefield losses takes on additional meaning when considering
that more than 30 million personnel wounded or killed in the First World War (Dupuy
and Dupuy 1993). While the data and substantive predictions suggest that military
organizations that had more sophisticated personnel and stratified bureaucracies than
their opponents operated more effectively during World War I, this does not mean they
were immune from experiencing a large number of casualties. Even militaries widely
perceived as professionalized and effective (e.g. Germany), did not achieve fewer
personnel losses than its opponent in every battle. In fact, Murray (2011) suggests that a
common trend among World War I participants was that they focused less on how to
minimize battle losses, but instead developed ways to help their troops tolerate casualties.
In Table 2.5, I present the battle efficacy of each war participant.
[Table 2.5 about here]
In addition to organizational traits, the relative share of democracy also affects
battlefield efficacy significantly. For every unit increase in the attacker’s proportion of
the democracy score, the attacker is expected to endure a 59 percent reduction in LER on
average. This finding is consistent with prior research that claims that military
organizations are microcosms of the societies they serve in terms of cultural norms and
initiative on the battlefield (Reiter 2007; Reiter and Stam 2002). Moreover, the statistical
findings support the idea that democracies produce relatively more effective military
personnel (Horowitz et al. 2011; Reiter 2007; Reiter and Stam 2002).
The presence of a military coalition also improves military effectiveness.
Specifically, the model indicates that on average, attackers that operate within a coalition
framework experience a 21 percent reduction in the proportional loss of military
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personnel. Military coalitions offer the advantage of aggregating military power to
overcome a common threat without the need of creating a formal alliance agreement (see
Leeds 1999; Morey 2015; Silkett 1993). This finding must be interpreted with caution
because the sample only includes 5 instances of multilateral efforts in battle.
Conclusion
This chapter presents a novel explanation for the variation in battlefield
effectiveness witnessed in the First World War by examining the organizational
structures of participating militaries. Accounting for organizational characteristics is
essential because organizational structure influences key factors of the military including
the development of group cohesion, mobilization and training of personnel, and the
institution a bureaucratic hierarchy (Millett et al. 1988; Soeters et al. 2010; Wilson 1989).
The empirical tests indicate that both personnel quality and stratification of the
bureaucratic hierarchy influences battlefield efficacy. Specifically, military organizations
with more sophisticated personnel and a larger command chain than their opponents
experienced significantly fewer battlefield casualties.
There is a danger that the present study attempts to generalize too much
information from a single instance of war. It would difficult to argue that actions and
outcomes of World War I have direct implications for all other wars in history. While a
centralized bureaucracy may have aided efficacy in this particular time period, it may no
longer be applicable to contemporary warfare involving advanced techniques and
technologies (see Biddle 2007; Murray 2011; Soeters et al. 2010; Wilson 1989).
Nevertheless, scholars continue to examine the First World War because it provides a
case in which participants of the conflict experiences considerable variation in terms of
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battlefield losses among participants, and an abundance of information is available
detailing political and military idiosyncrasies of belligerent parties. Moreover, this
particular conflict presents a puzzle because common arguments of military aptitude,
domestic regimes, and pre-war coordination cannot fully explain the outcome of the
Great War even after almost a century of scholarly work.
The conclusions of this study may also have implications for conflicts involving
coalitions and alliances, in which various military organizations must cooperate and
coordinate actions (Rice 1997). While military organizations may benefit by altering their
bureaucratic structure to comport with potential coalition partners, implementing such
reforms present a challenge. By their nature, bureaucratic organizations favor slow,
incremental changes in behavior to create predictability and stability within its ranks
(Allison 1971; Wilson 1989). Moreover, differences in the sophistication of troops would
limit the ability of coalition partners to develop common methods of addressing a shared
concern. Benasahel (2007: 196) recognizes this challenge when noting,
The most capable military may not be able to execute operations in its
preferred manner if it is operating as part of an alliance: it may have to
adjust the very qualities that make it so capable to accommodate its allies
and partners. It may not be possible, for example, to execute highly
flexible and adaptive operations when inflexible and static partners are
present on the same battlefield, or to use the full capabilities of advanced
technologies alongside militaries that cannot operate in a similar manner.
Whether acting unilaterally or as part of a multilateral alignment, organizational
structure influences the ability of a military to implement actions effectively on the
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battlefield. By examining organizational structures alongside convention measures of
state resources and capacity, researchers can clarify the role of organizational behaviors
to conflict outcomes. Specifically, future work should consider how organizational
structure affects a military’s willingness to adopt advanced technologies (see Horowitz
2011) and utilize these assets during conflict. Recognizing the increasing lethality of
modern weapons as well as the skills required to use these tools (see Biddle 2004, 2007),
military and political leaders must identify organizational structures that allow for
sufficient command and control, but also create personnel capable of responding
appropriately to hostile battlefield conditions.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: WWI Participants in Data
Country
Austria-Hungary
France
Germany
Italy
Turkey
Russia
Serbia
United Kingdom
United States

Attacker
7
12
26
9
0
4
1
21
22

Defender
11
10
47
3
11
10
1
7
2

Total
18
22
73
12
11
14
2
28
24

Note: Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Japan, Portugal, and Romania are not included in the
data.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
LER
Sophistication
Stratification
Personnel
Democracy
Human Capital
Duration
Coalition

N
102
102
102
102
102
102
102
102

Mean
0.516
0.568
0.456
0.612
0.591
0.564
9.331
0.039

Note: LER refers to loss exchange ratio
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Std. Dev.
0.187
0.254
0.097
0.122
0.165
0.175
17.058
0.195

Min
0.062
0.018
0.341
0.333
0.167
0.201
0.052
0.000

Max
0.923
0.982
0.659
0.923
0.833
0.936
130.000
1.000

Table 2.3: Organizational Structures of WWI Participants
Country
Austria-Hungary
France
Germany
Italy
Turkey
Russia
Serbia
United Kingdom
United States

Per Soldier Spending (1917)
3411.204
1133.048
1328.996
62.492
57.681
446.409
107.6218
1715.679
1022.646

Military Ranks
29
19
28
16
20
37
15
18
17

Note: I compile the number of military ranks from Bennett (2013).
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Table 2.4: Military Organizations and Battlefield Efficacy

Sophistication
Stratification

Model 1
-0.216***
(0.068)
0.084
(0.194)

Model 2
-0.323***
(0.110)
-0.930**
(0.408)

Model 3
-0.267**
(0.105)
-0.746**
(0.373)

-0.024
(0.136)

-0.037
(0.123)
-0.676***
(0.246)
0.367*
(0.220)

0.615***
(0.143)
102
0.084
3.564

1.340***
(0.298)
102
0.154
3.918

-0.061
(0.125)
-0.554**
(0.233)
0.295
(0.207)
0.001*
(0.001)
-0.214***
(0.050)
1.203***
(0.280)
102
0.191
14.261

Interaction
Military Size
Democracy
Education
Battle Duration
Coalition
Constant
N
R2
F-Value

Notes: Ordinary Least Squares Regression
The dependent variable is the loss exchange ratio for each battle-dyad.
Interaction refers to (Sophistication x Stratification)
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
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Model 4
-0.244
(0.281)
-0.716
(0.506)
-0.053
(0.611)
-0.062
(0.127)
-0.552**
(0.237)
0.297
(0.207)
0.001*
(0.001)
-0.214***
(0.050)
1.188***
(0.326)
102
0.191
12.527

Table 2.5: Battlefield Efficacy of WWI Participants
Country
Austria-Hungary
France
Germany
Italy
Turkey
Russia
Serbia
United Kingdom
United States

Effective Attacker
3
0
17
1
0
1
1
11
2

Effective Defender
2
4
18
2
7
8
0
4
1

Overall Efficacy
05/18 (28%)
04/22 (18%)
35/73 (48%)
03/12 (25%)
07/11 (64%)
09/14 (64%)
01/02 (50%)
15/28 (54%)
03/24 (13%)

Notes: I categorize states based on the loss exchange ratio of the battle.
I consider a military organization effective if it experienced 50 percent or less of a
battle’s casualties.
Overall Efficacy calculates the number of “effective battles” out of total battles.
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Figure 2.1: Marginal Effect of Sophistication on Battlefield Efficacy (OLS Model 3)

Note: This represents change in Sophistication with all other variables held at
their mean.
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Figure 2.2: Marginal Effect of Stratification on Battlefield Efficacy (OLS Model 3)

Note: This represents change in Stratifcation with all other variables held at their
mean.
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Figure 2.3: Predictive Margins of Interaction on Battlefield Efficacy (OLS Model 4)

Note: Predicted margins are conditional on values of Sophistication and
Stratification.
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Figure 2.4: Marginal Effect of Interaction on Battlefield Efficacy (OLS Model 4)

Notes: The figure illustrates the predicted LER at different levels of
Sophistication if Stratification is held at 0.5.
The red line identifies a 0.5 share of Loss Exchange Ratio.
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Chapter 3: Cooperation, Coordination, and Alliance Formation
In the aftermath of the Second World War, many European states struggled to
rebuild their economic and political infrastructures while also maintaining a military
capable of addressing security concerns. Limited resources coupled with fears of
increased Soviet influence prompted the United States, Canada, and much of Western
Europe to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949. The
NATO alliance established a collective defense agreement for all signatories and a
framework for allied consultation regarding threats and matters of security (NATO 2014).
In order to harmonize military abilities among the allies, NATO members agreed to
develop common standards for training in weapons technology to ease coordination
efforts necessary for conducting joint military operations (Bensahal 2007; Leeds and
Anac 2005). Additionally, NATO members adopted an alliance-wide command structure
that operated independently of individual states (Bensahal 2007; Leeds and Anac 2005;
Wallace 2008). The continued efforts by NATO to institutionalize best practices and
procedures for its allied military personnel demonstrate that coordination, not simply
cooperation, is necessary for an alliance to function effectively.28 While states can attract
potential allies initially out of common foreign policy concerns and mutual interests, a
cooperative relationship does not guarantee smooth integration of military personnel or
collaborative implementation of allied operations. Because states are unlikely to enter
into a costly alliance covenant with incompatible partners, how do considerations of
military coordination influence patterns of alliance formation?

28

Following the Membership Action Plan, current NATO members evaluate the military
organizations of aspiring members before approving additional allies (NATO 2014).
46

Military alliances require elements of cooperation and coordination in order to
aggregate resources, conduct joint operations, and deter outside aggressors.29 Cooperation
occurs when states share common interests and adopt policies that benefit at least one of
the actors, while not making other members worse off (Gulati et al. 2012). The
possibility for cooperation is an essential first step when identifying a potential alliance
partner as state leaders are unlikely to pay the extensive costs created by formal alliances
unless signatories share common interests and approaches to international problems. In
order to translate mutual goals into action, alliance partners must also coordinate military
activities. Such coordination entails a deliberate and orderly adjustment of practices and
procedures to implement allied plans (Gulati et al. 2012). Allied militaries that have
comparable organizational and professional cultures require less of a learning curve to
reconcile their differences and collaborate effectively. Recognizing the roles of both
cooperation and coordination, I investigate patterns of alliance formation from 1816-2007
and find that states with similar military organizations are significantly more likely to
create security alliances. These results suggest that states evaluate the prospects of both
cooperation and coordination with potential allies before forming alliances. This means
that it is not enough for allies to agree on broad political and military objectives; they
must also develop compatible organizational practices and military acumen as well.
This chapter begins by introducing existing research on alliance formation and
describing how political, geographic, and temporal characteristics influence interstate
cooperation. Next, I distinguish the concepts of cooperation and coordination and discuss
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Prior research suggests that alliances are most likely to deter outside aggression when
the partnership signals a high degree of cooperation and coordination to the rest of the
international system (Leeds and Anac 2005).
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how each element contributes to the creation of alliance agreements and the
implementation of joint military ventures. Third, I devise a theoretical explanation for
military alliance formation in which states assess political and military traits of other
states when identifying and pursuing compatible alliance partners. I then use statistical
analyses to evaluate how state and military characteristics shape the likelihood that states
form a military alliance. Finally, I expand on the importance of cooperation and
coordination in the context of alliance agreements and consider how these elements factor
into other forms of interstate collaboration.
Alliance Formation
In the presence of limited resources or an external threat, political leaders may
choose to take up arms with other states in the form of a military alliance. Alliances are a
desirable policy because they allow signatories to redirect resources away from defense
organizations without compromising national security (Morrow 1991, 1993; Pressman
2008).30 Allies can also develop economies of scale that facilitate effective collaboration
by dividing security functions according to each member’s particular strengths (Kimball
2006; Morgan and Palmer 2003; Morrow 1993). To achieve these mutual gains, states
must be willing and able to sacrifice a degree of decision-making autonomy and attempt
to align allied interests (Morrow 1991, 1993; Pressman 2008).
States are capable of cooperating militarily without a formal alliance agreement,
but the high costs associated with negotiating alliance terms demonstrate the intention of

30

Alliances create a mechanism for member states to acquire resources and security
without extracting additional resources or commitments from the domestic population
(Feaver 1999; Huntington 1957; Morrow 1991).
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signatories to honor their commitments (Kimball 2006; Leeds 2003; Wallace 2008).31
The establishment of a formal agreement not only links each ally’s security to every other
member’s ambition, but also threatens the credibility of states that renege on alliance
responsibilities (Leeds et al. 2000; Morrow 1993; Wallace 2008). Alliances
institutionalize channels through which signatories influence political and military
decisions of their partners, so the relative power of signatories shapes the likelihood that
the covenant will be honored (Morrow 1991; Leeds 2003; Pressman 2008). Consideration
of these factors entails that states do not select alliance partners at random or unwittingly
enter into military agreements with states that could disproportionately influence
decision-making processes (Morrow 1991; Pressman 2008).32 Thus, evaluating the
prospects for interstate cooperation is an essential prerequisite for identifying and
pursuing potential alliance partners.
Numerous studies identify characteristics that can make states more or less
attractive as military allies. Some scholars propose that states sharing similar domestic
political institutions are far more likely to create alliances with each other (Lai and Reiter
2000; Leeds 1999). Leaders who operate under different institutional settings may be
incapable of credibly committing to particular actions in the future or adapting to changes
in the international system (Leeds 1999). Specifically, democracies that are responsive to
domestic pressures, such as public opinion and elections, are more likely to make

Forming alliances with military obligations require signatories to “tie their hands” and
“sink costs” into the agreement, which should send a signal of a credible commitment to
the international system (Fearon 1997; Thyne 2006).
32
Although alliances can form between asymmetric powers, member states tend to
benefit from separate issues, rather than one simply overpowering the other (Morrow
1991; Pressman 2008).
31
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credible commitments, but may be slow or unable to make commitments in the first place
(Leeds 1999). Likewise, autocratic states can adopt policies relatively quickly, but lack
incentives to remain committed if leaders no longer perceive the agreement as beneficial
(Leeds 1999). These fundamental differences can potentially hinder states from
developing a common approach to a crisis or cooperating on and off the battlefield.33
States are also more likely to pursue alliance agreements in the presence of a
shared military threat. Alliances offer states the potential to aggregate capabilities and
enhance the collective capabilities of the group, which may be necessary to either balance
or deter an external aggressor (Glenn 2011; Leeds and Anac 2005; Weitsman 2003). A
mutual threat incentivizes investment into the war effort and provides common ground
necessary to achieve some level of cooperation (Weitsman 2003). In fact, Weitsman
(2003: 82) argues that when states face “…a uniform external threat, it will be relatively
easy for them to coordinate their goals and strategies to attain those goals.” This behavior
was evident in both World Wars, where the threat of German ascension brought together
states with similar domestic regimes, such as the United States and Canada, as well as
those with disparate regime types, including the United Kingdom and Russia. The mutual
threat should have been enough for the allies to operate as a military coalition, but they
still chose to use formal agreements to institutionalize a cooperative relationship.34 These
states were drawn together initially by a shared perception of threat, but fears of
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These difficulties are common in ad hoc coalitions where partner states are typically
unfamiliar with one another (Glenn 2011).
34
Despite sharing a substantial external threat, allies on both sides of the First and
Second World Wars largely failed to develop a common strategic outlook or standardized
military practices (Wallace 2008).
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abandonment or entrapment encouraged these states to formalize their relationship
through an alliance agreement (Pressman 2008; Snyder 1984).35
In situations where states share similar degrees of material and political power, a
military alliance likely serves as a tool of capability aggregation to deter or defeat a
common threat (Morrow 1991). This symmetric agreement initially limits the risk of
entrapment or abandonment because both members of the alliance need each other
equally to preserve their national security (Morrow 1991; Pressman 2008). Yet, if one
ally increases its capabilities and is able to maintain its security unilaterally, the value of
the alliance decreases along with the likelihood that alliance commitments will be
honored (Morrow 1991; Pressman 2008). Conversely, states can use a strategy of issuelinkage to establish an alliance in the presence of a power asymmetry (Morrow 1991;
Pressman 2008). The ally with substantial resources can enhance the security capabilities
of the lesser ally in exchange for concessions in decision-making authority (Pressman
2008).36 The ability to trade security for autonomy allows asymmetric military alliances
to stay intact after changes in relative power, and provides states an opportunity to align
military interests through the formation of economies of scale (Leeds 2003; Leeds and
Anac 2005; Morrow 1991; Pressman 2008).
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States can overcome differences through formal alliances because the cost of
establishing the agreement creates increased costs in abrogating an agreement. This
increases the value of joint action (Leeds and Anac 2005; Leeds and Savun 2007).
36
A potential danger associated with an asymmetric relationship is that cooperation can
transform into cooptation, leaving the weaker ally at the mercy of the stronger state’s
policy demands. Likewise, when given the assurance of a stronger state’s military
support, a weaker ally may become emboldened, adopt aggressive policies, and entrap
the more powerful ally in a conflict (Mearsheimer 2001; Pressman 2008).
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A common thread running through each explanation is that states tend to form
alliances with those that share similar domestic institutions, a mutual external threat, and
foreign policy interests. By having some form of common ground, potential allies should
be able to cooperate in the negotiations of alliance agreements and the implementation of
their commitments. Cooperation among states may be necessary to get potential allies to
the negotiation table, but it does not create an immediate harmony of interests. In fact,
states need a formalized agreement to provide military consultation or support because
they have diverse interests.37 Even though alliances can foster cooperation among
members, this relationship requires the joint pursuit of goals that benefit some partners
and do not make allies worse off than before the agreement was established. Intraalliance cooperation entails that signatories share a common objective, but they may not
adopt the same vision of how to pursue the goal.
Previous literature argues that cooperation is essential for allies to agree on
policies in principle, but it largely overlooks how prospects of coordination factor into
alliance formation decisions. The role of coordination is critical because cooperation
alone does not guarantee the capability of implementing allied plans if a conflict or crisis
occurs. Specifically, allied states must also coordinate their practices, procedures, and
military activities in order to operate as a cohesive unit (Weitsman 2014).
Cooperation and Coordination
Scholars often use the words “cooperation” and “coordination” interchangeably,
but each term denotes a distinct concept. Cooperation refers to a “joint pursuit of agreed-
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If allies had identical interests, they would come to the aid of each other without the
cost of a formal alliance agreement in order to pursue their common goals (Morrow
1991).
52

on goals in a manner corresponding to a shared understanding about contributions and
payoffs” (Gulati et al. 2012, 533). In other words, states can cooperate by identifying a
common problem and agreeing to participate in the resolution of the issue. States may be
able to settle on mutual understanding of the problem at-hand, but cooperation does not
guarantee a shared strategy or approach to the predicament. Even in an ideal situation
where there is a perfect alignment of interests and goals, allies may have difficulty
implementing joint tasks because they are unable to develop an intra-alliance division of
labor or they struggle adapting cohesively to changing circumstances (Glenn 2011; Gulati
et al. 2012; Weitsman 2014).
In addition to cooperation, allied states must also be able to coordinate their
actions. Scholars define coordination as “the deliberate and orderly alignment or
adjustment of partners’ actions to achieve jointly determined goals” (Gulati et al. 2012,
537). While cooperation entails a mutual understanding of goals, the benefit of
aggregating resources, and payoffs of joint action, coordination indicates the specific
ways that partners devise and implement operations (Glenn 2011; Gulati et al. 2012).
Coordination focuses less on sustaining a relationship and deterring opportunistic
behavior, and instead emphasizes mechanisms, such as information-sharing and
standardized practices, that facilitate integration of each partner’s contributions to the
alliance (Gulati et al. 2012). Put simply, coordination ensures that allied actions “click”
and are able to create desired outcomes through contributions by all signatories (Gulati et
al. 2012; Weitsman 2003; 2014).
By describing these concepts separately, it becomes apparent that both
cooperation and coordination are essential features of collaborative efforts. Cooperation
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is a prerequisite for any allied actions because states will not pursue a joint venture
without first achieving some baseline of shared interest and commitment to the joint
effort (Gulati et al. 2012). Likewise, to maintain a cooperative and effective relationship,
states must be able reconcile differences, develop shared practices, and implement
actions as a collective unit (Glenn 2011; Gulati et al. 2012; Weitsman 2014). This means
that allies cannot coordinate in the absence of a reliable commitment to pursue joint
objectives, and they are incapable of putting their contributions to productive use without
a mutual understanding of the task at-hand. Recognizing the extensive interplay between
cooperation and coordination, I contend that alliances form when states cooperate to
create a common set of interests and have military organizations capable of coordinating
actions.
Choosing Alliance Partners
States expect their military organizations to provide essential security needs such
as ensuring territorial integrity, promoting domestic order, and projecting state interests
beyond national borders. Most militaries operate toward a similar mission, but the
professional nature of their actions and approaches to issues on the battlefield reflect
distinct norms and behaviors of the society that they serve (Reiter 2007; Reiter and Stam
2002). The share of resources devoted to the military not only shapes the capabilities of
the armed forces, but also demonstrates how the state prioritizes the security apparatus
(Brooks 2007a; Huntington 1957; Soeters et al. 2010). Because states operate with a
finite amount of distributable goods, a continual competition for resources emerges
between the military and other government agencies to maintain organizational relevance
and vitality (Allison 1971; Barnett and Finnemore 2004).
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This competitive environment places constraints on military action by defining
acceptable performance metrics and making allocations of resources and responsibilities
conditional on the perception of the military as a central institution of the state (Allison
1971; Burk 2001; Reiter and Stam 2002; Tellis 2000).38 The military’s share of resources
also influences the professional nature of its personnel by determining the number of
combatants recruited, limiting the types of weapons and technologies available, and
constraining how troops are supplied and trained (Brooks 2007a; Burk 2001; Huntington
1957; Tellis 2000).39 Insufficient numbers of troops and a lack of sophisticated personnel
force military organizations to implement suboptimal strategies, operations, and tactics,
all of which increase the risk of casualties and failure in the theater of war (Biddle and
Long 2004; Reiter and Meek 1999).
Combining efforts under the auspices of an alliance requires each state to
relinquish some degree of autonomy, so state leaders must carefully decide if joint
operations will increase the probability of achieving mutual goals without endangering
the state’s relative power (Mearsheimer 2001; Pressman 2008). Recognizing that
decision-makers select alliance partners in the imperfect marketplace of the international
system, they must judge other states by perceived qualities and characteristics (Crescenzi

38

States that devote substantial material and human resources to its armed forces
demonstrate that the military is a vital organ of the state. On the other hand, states that
allocate limited personnel and resources to their military indicate that national security is
not a top priority, and in turn constrain its ability to pursue complex or large-scale
operations (Allison 1971; Bensahel 2007; Feaver 1999).
39
Personnel sophistication and professionalization translates into fundamental features of
a military organization including methods of communication through the chain of
command, the development of cohesion among units, and the institutionalization of
norms to abide by the bureaucratic stratification of authority (Millet et al. 1986; Soeters
et al. 2010; Wilson 1989).
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et al. 2012).40 All other things equal, states prefer to align themselves with states that
have shared foreign policy interests, are subject to similar domestic political pressures,
and are likely to honor their agreements (Crescenzi et al. 2012; Lai and Reiter 2000;
Leeds 1999, 2003). States that share these traits are more likely to have common goals
and mutual interests, which provides fertile ground for a cooperative relationship (Gulati
et al. 2012).41
Beyond identifying potential allies by addressing cooperation concerns, state
leaders must also account for prospects of military coordination before making a formal
security pact.42 Even if potential allies share a common vision on political and security
objectives, differences in aptitude, training, and professional experience necessitate
negotiation and experimentation before dissimilarities can be reconciled and effective
collaboration can occur (Soeters et al. 2010; Weitsman 2003, 2014). In situations where
there are vast differences between capabilities and methods of behavior, allies must
invest considerable effort to accommodate their partners (Bensahel 2007; Glenn 2011;
Szayna et al. 2001). Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A. Silkett recognizes the potential costs
associated with intra-alliance variation when stating,
Cultural differences, subtle or substantial, may easily become debilitating
if not understood and appreciated. Differences in discipline, work ethic,

40

Political leaders have difficulty identifying ideal alliance partners because of imperfect
information, so they often rely on observable traits to make their decisions (Morrow
1991).
41
Cooperation entails that allied states demonstrate a substantive congruence of interests,
often in terms of shared security interests on a regional and global scale (Szayna et al.
2001).
42
State leaders can minimize coordination costs and the likelihood of coordination failure
by seeking partners perceived to be competent and compatible in terms of resources,
organizational processes, language, and culture (Gulati et al. 2012).
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class distinctions, religious requirements, standards of living, traditions –
all can cause friction, misunderstanding, and cracks in cohesion (Silkett
1993, 79).43
The structure of allied military organizations influences how other states perceive the
security partnership.44 When military personnel come from distinct professional cultures
and organizational backgrounds, administrators and practitioners within the alliance may
employ different and potentially incompatible practices and procedures (Gulati et al.
2012; Silkett 1993; Soeters et al. 2010). If military organizations share similar structures
and routines, they necessitate less of a learning curve to bridge cultural and professional
differences due to a comparable understanding of standard operating procedures and
hierarchical controls (Glenn 2011; Gulati et al. 2012; Weitsman 2014).45 Allied militaries
that cooperate in principle but lack common military characteristics may have difficulty
understanding each other’s contributions and may fail to integrate them into a cohesive
strategy or operation (Bensahel 2007; Gulati et al. 2012).46 Moreover, allies with
substantial dissimilarities in military organizations do not have an overlap in knowledge
and capabilities, leaving partner states uncertain in the abilities of one another and
discouraging necessary coordination and cooperative efforts (Gulati et al. 2012).
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Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A. Silkett served as Associate Director of Military Strategy
in the Department of Corresponding Studies at the US Army War College (Silkett 1993).
44
An organization’s structure refers to internal pattern of relationships, authority, and
communication demonstrated by its personnel (Fredrickson 1986).
45
Shared institutional norms can allow for coordination among allies lacking a history of
collaboration by providing a basis for metrics, technical and administrative meanings,
and values related to reciprocity, information sharing, and feedback mechanisms (Gulati
et al. 2012).
46
While military coordination requires allies to change behaviors to pursue a mutual
goal, it does not require each partner to implement identical methods of coercion
(Morrow 1986).
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Previous literature argues that states create alliance agreements based on the
understanding that allies are capable of cooperating. While the prospects of cooperation
are a necessary step to identify potential allies, states must also consider how partners
would implement terms of the agreement. Forecasts for effective coordination are notably
more important in military alliances that require consultation or preparation for joint
actions. Because political leaders select allies based on perceptions of other states, known
characteristics of military organizations likely factor in the decision-making process.
Moreover, states pursue military alliances with the intent of enhancing national security,
even if this means bearing costs to coordinate actions. To minimize this burden, alliances
are most likely to form between states that have militaries practicing similar procedures
and accustomed to comparable training and technology.47 This means that all other things
equal, states are more likely to form military alliances when there are similarities in
military organizations.
Hypothesis 1: As military organizations of two states become more similar, the dyad is
more likely to form an alliance.
Military alliances offer the possibility of enhancing national security by
aggregating resources with another state, but such integration does not occur by simply
signing an agreement.48 In order to realize benefits from an alliance partnership, allies
must be able to cooperate and coordinate. Cooperation is a necessary element for
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Militaries that have similar technological standards, organizational structures, and
knowledge bases can reduce uncertainties about coordination and lessens the likelihood
of incompatibilities (Gulati et al. 2012).
48
In order to mitigate fears of abandonment and entrapment, alliances develop
multilateral agreements based upon narrow and relatively explicit terms and obligations
(Leeds et al. 2000).
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successful alliance partnerships, noting that allied states must agree that a joint venture is
an efficient method of achieving particular goals. Beyond this, allies must coordinate
actions, which may entail harmonizing standard practices and procedures between their
military organizations. Because states select themselves into alliance agreements, they are
rational to pursue partnerships with states that share similar interests and have
comparable military capabilities.
Research Design
Political leaders pursue alliances to solidify state security, but these agreements
require leaders to sacrifice some decision-making authority in order to coordinate
interests and practices. Before entering into a covenant that entails a great deal of cost
and commitment, state leaders evaluate potential allies and establish agreements with
those perceived as the most capable and compatible. This study investigates the relative
importance of state characteristics by analyzing alliances formed from 1816-2007. A
dyad-year is the unit of analysis.49 Because political decision-makers can create or
modify alliance agreements at any point in time, each dyad remains in the sample, even if
they have an active alliance.50 I compile the number of initiated alliance agreements from
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Some scholars may argue that the sample should only include politically relevant
dyads. Politically relevant dyads exclude dyads that may lack the capability to interact
with one another (Lemke and Reed 2001). Scholars often operationalize politically
relevant dyads as geographically continuous states or any pair of states that includes a
major power (Lemke and Reed 2001). Because states can establish asymmetric alliances
and enter into these agreements for purposes beyond resource aggregation (see Morrow
1991; Pressman 2008), I conclude that limiting the sample to politically relevant dyads
unnecessarily introduces selection bias into the statistical analyses.
50
Scholars may contend that dyads should be removed from the sample after they have
an alliance agreement in place, but this would not be appropriate for two reasons. First,
censoring the sample ignores the possibility that domestic issues (e.g., new leadership,
regime change) or international factors (e.g., conflict) would alter state decisions to form
and terminate alliance agreements (see Leeds and Savun 2007). Second, because each
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version 4.1 of the Correlates of War Formal Alliance Dataset (Gibler 2009). To identify
general trends in alliance formation frequency, Figure 3.1 below illustrates the number of
alliance agreements in each year of the sample.
[Figure 3.1 about here]
Dependent Variable
The establishment of an alliance agreement takes place when state leaders agree
to collaborate in a specific fashion through written treaties or public proclamations
(Leeds 1999, 2003). Leeds (2003) indicates that the content of a given alliance agreement
determines the specific actions and level of commitment expected of signatories. For
instance, scholars consider defense pacts to entail the highest level of commitment
because they require alliances partners to provide military assistance to any signatory
attacked by a third party (Gibler 2009; Leeds 2003). On the other hand, previous
literature suggests that military consultation (i.e. entente) agreements are the lowest level
of military commitment, but they still require some degree of military cooperation and
coordination during a crisis (Gibler 2009; Leeds 2003). The focus of this study is on
alliances requiring military collaboration, so I create three dichotomous variables that
indicate when states form (1) any type of alliance agreement, (2) a defense pact, or (3) a
consultation pact. Each variable is coded as 1 if an alliance is established in a dyad-year
and coded 0 otherwise.

alliance agreement requires different degrees of commitment from its signatories (see
Leeds 2003), it would be an atheoretical decision to only account for the first agreement
between a dyad. For example, the dyad of the United Kingdom and France would be
removed from the sample after a consultation pact was enacted in 1827.
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Independent Variables
State leaders consider the potential compatibility between its armed forces and the
militaries of other states when pursuing a security alliance. These alliances require some
degree of collaboration among military organizations, so states with comparable
militaries are often the most attractive alliance partners. Because leaders make decisions
in an imperfect marketplace of information, they rely on known metrics to approximate
characteristics of potential allies (Crescenzi et al. 2012; Gulati et al. 2012; Szayna et al.
2001). As a result, leaders assess the organizational attributes of another state’s armed
forces based on resources devoted to the defense apparatus. The investment of state
resources shapes how the armed forces are trained, their access to technology, and if
society perceives the military as a legitimate profession (Burk 2001; Feaver 1999; Soeters
et al. 2010). Moreover, military organizations with access to considerable resources are
more likely to produce professionalized personnel capable of using advanced weaponry
and executing complex operations (Reiter and Stam 2002; Szayna et al. 2001; Tellis
2000).
It is intuitive to evaluate military organizations based on measures of a state’s
total expenditures, personnel numbers, and access to material resources, but these data do
not allow for cross-national comparisons and can lead to inaccurate conclusions.
Specifically, absolute measures of military spending and the size of a state’s armed forces
do not account for differences in economic strength and total population. In fact, prior
research argues that the proportion of resources devoted to military preparation provides
a more appropriate measure of capability and resolve than absolute measures of personnel
or expenditures (Wayman et al. 1983). Acknowledging the need to use proportional data,
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a logical step is to evaluate military capacity by the proportion of state wealth allocated to
the defense apparatus. The most common measure of state wealth and resources is gross
domestic product (Gleditsch 2002). Unfortunately, because reliable measures of GDP are
temporally limited to the latter half of the 20th century and suffer from an extensive
missing data problem, a defense budget metric is of limited value (Gleditsch 2002;
Wayman et al. 1983).51
In light of these constraints, I select to evaluate military organizations based on
the share of state resources devoted to the armed forces. Although there is no perfect
measure to assess military organizations, the number and sophistication of military
personnel can both shape the capacity of a military. Therefore, I elect to use two variables
to capture characteristics of military organizations. First, states that maintain large
standing militaries demonstrate that security is a high priority and that it necessitates
substantial participation by the population (Feaver 1999; Huntington 1957; Tellis 2000).
To capture the extent of military participation in each state, I calculate the number of
military personnel divided by the total population (Wayman et al. 1983). Using the
proportion of military personnel to the total population allows for cross-national
comparisons, which is not possible through measures of absolute military size. Because
the unit of analysis is a dyad-year, I create a variable that is the absolute difference in
military personnel per capita for each dyad and name it participation difference.
This variable measures a difference between proportions, so it is limited to values
between 0 and 1. The distribution of this variable is highly skewed, so I transform it using
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Previous work also suggests that measures of gross domestic product fails to account
for idiosyncrasies in economic development and includes economic activity that is
irrelevant to the capacity of the defense apparatus (Wayman et al. 1983).
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the natural log.52 Taking the natural log of numbers in this range produces a scale of all
negative values.53 For example, in 2007, the participation difference between the United
States and Canada is quite small at .003, while the difference between Niger and North
Korea is relatively large .047. Although these are both positive values, the natural log of
these measures is -5.722 and -3.088 respectively. Thus, the most negative values of
participation difference represent the most similar dyads, while the least negative figures
the most dissimilar dyads.
Political leaders can also influence the sophistication of its personnel by investing
in innovative training methods and advanced technology. Specifically, prior studies argue
that the rate of per soldier spending indicates the type of technology, equipment, and
training programs available to military personnel (Reiter and Stam 2002). Following the
practices in previous research, I divide total military expenditures by the number of
military personnel measure the quality and sophistication of armed forces (Powell 2012;
Reiter and Stam 2002; Szayna et al. 2001). I create the variable sophistication difference,
which calculates the difference of per soldier spending for each dyad-year. The
distribution of this variable is skewed, so it is transformed using the natural log.54 There
are some cases where the difference in per soldier spending is less than one, which results
in negative values after the log transformation (Azad 2007). Therefore, sophistication
difference contains both negative and positive values and negative values indicating
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See Figure 3.3A in the appendix for the distribution of the participation difference
variable.
53
To calculate the natural log of a value less than 1, Euler’s constant is raised to a
number that is less than the zero power: a negative number (Azad 2007).
54
See Figure 3.4A in the appendix for the distribution of the transformed sophistication
difference variable.
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relatively similar dyads, while large positive values indicate the most different dyads. I
compile military personnel, military expenditure, and total population figures from
version 4.0 of the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer 1987).
I present the descriptive statistics for participation difference, sophistication difference,
and all other variables used in the statistical analyses in Table 3.1 below.
These measures do not identify the specific strengths and weaknesses of a given
military organization, but they do approximate the extent of roles and responsibilities
given to the armed forces. For example, states that have the highest measures of
sophistication include the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.55 Likewise,
states that demonstrate a high level of participation include France, Switzerland, and
Germany. It is not surprising that a number of the aforementioned states are also partners
in security alliances. Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that armed forces with similar levels
of participation and sophistication demonstrate comparable capabilities and
organizational characteristics, which in turn encourages alliance formation.
Control Variables
Prior research indicates that alliances often occur between states with similar
domestic institutions (Lai and Reiter 2000; Leeds 1999). Moreover, scholars suggest that
democratic states are relatively reliable alliance partners because their leaders face heavy

55

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are also rank near the top in terms of per soldier spending.
This provides credence to Powell (2012) who argues that the impact of per soldier
spending varies across regime types. He suggests that democratic regimes that increase
per soldier spending will produce increase security capabilities, while autocracies will use
this investment to pay off military leaders. Although it is possible for state leaders to
overspend on the military, or unwisely invest in inefficient technologies and corrupt
personnel, it is a general rule that militaries with higher per soldier spending demonstrate
the most sophistication and troop sophistication (Reiter and Stam 2002; Szayna et al.
2001).
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costs for backing down from an international agreement that may not exist in nondemocratic regimes (Leeds 1999; 2003). To evaluate the influence of regime type and
similarity, I create two variables using the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2014). The
first is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if both states have democratic regimes, and 0
otherwise. States are considered democracies if they have a score of 5 or above on the
Polity scale.56 To measure the effect of regime similarity, another variable is coded as the
absolute difference of aggregate Polity scores within a dyad. Greater values on this
variable indicate increasingly different regimes in a dyad.
Previous literature indicates states pursue potential allies out of mutual policy
interests or because they face a common threat (Crescenzi et al. 2012). As states become
increasingly similar in their foreign policy portfolios, prospects for cooperation and
coordination are greater, and in turn make them attractive alliance partners. To capture
foreign policy resemblance, I use Signorio and Ritter’s (1999) S-Score. This variable has
a range of -1 to +1, with the most different portfolios approaching -1 and the most similar
portfolios approaching +1 (Crescenzi et al. 2012; Signorio and Ritter 1999). I create a
variable that represents the absolute difference in S-Scores for each dyad in the sample.57
In order to reap the greatest benefits from an alliance, partner states can minimize costs
associated with interstate communication and transportation. States located in close
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I adopt this threshold for democracy to remain consistent with recent studies of alliance
formation (see Crescenzi et al. 2012; Gibler 2008; Gibler and Wohlford 2006; Lai and
Reiter 2000). While other scholars have used a higher threshold for joint democracy (see
Johnson and Leeds 2011; Leeds 2003; Leeds and Savun 2007), using a more restrictive
cutoff does not change the statistical or substantive influence of the variable.
57
I conducted additional tests using Strezhnev and Voeten’s (2013) UN Voting similarity
scores. Voting similarity is positively correlated with the S-Score, but results using this
variable are excluded because they only cover the international system from 1946-2012.
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proximity not only require fewer resources to transport goods and personnel, but are
likely to have common regional interests as well. Moreover, allies require less effort to
intervene militarily if they share geographic proximity (Lai and Reiter 2000; Walt 1987).
The measure for geography is the capital-to-capital distance (miles) for each dyad. I
compile data on distance using the EUGene data generation program (Bennett and Stam
2000).
States that are considered major powers are attractive alliance partners because
they have a disproportionate amount of material resources within the international system
(Lai and Reiter 2000; Morrow 1991). Likewise, major powers frequently have
geopolitical interests on a global scale, so they have incentives to increase their alliance
networks to ensure their spheres of interest (Lai and Reiter; Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz
1979). To account for alliances involving major power, I create a dichotomous variable
coded as 1 if at least one member of the dyad is a major power and 0 otherwise.
States are motivated to align security interests with one another when facing a
common external threat. Alliances not only decrease the likelihood that signatories will
be attacked, but also makes allies more likely to intervene in conflict because the third
party is a shared enemy (Gibler 2008; Lai and Reiter 2000). To measure the influence of
a common threat, I construct a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if both states engaged in
a militarized dispute against the same adversary within the previous 10 years and 0
otherwise. I compile dispute data from version 4.01 of the Correlates of War Militarized
Interstate Dispute dataset (Ghosn et al. 2004).
The presence of bipolarity during the Cold War facilitated states aligning into
major alliance structures. During this time, the United States and Soviet Union fought for
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influence in part by expanding their respective alliance networks. To account for this
systemic increase in alliance formation activity, I create a dichotomous variable coded as
1 if the observation occurred during the Cold War era, and 0 otherwise.58
States exist within an anarchic and competitive system, so they make the decision
to ally under conditions of limited information (Crescenzi et al. 2012). While a state can
develop a history of dependability through a direct relationship with a particular state
(i.e., dyadic relationships), its dealings with the rest of the international system (i.e.,
extra-dyadic relationships) also contribute to its image (Crescenzi et al. 2012). Because
states prefer forming alliances with states that have a reputation for upholding
commitments (Crescenzi et al. 2012), a potential ally’s record of cooperation (or a lack
thereof), provide essential information. Therefore, states are more likely to establish
alliances with states that have a long history in the international system. I account for this
temporal dimension by constructing two variables that indicate the number of years and
number of years squared since a dyad has existed (Carter and Signorino 2010).
[Table 3.1 about here]
Statistical Model
The statistical analyses focus on the likelihood that states establish (1) a formal
alliance, (2) a defense pact, or (3) a consultation pact. Because each dependent variable is
dichotomous, I employ logistic regression. Logistic regression models the log odds of the
dependent variable as a linear combination of the predictor variables (Hosmer and
Lemeshow 2000). The logistic regression results indicate the change in the log odds of
alliance formation for a one-unit increase a given variable. I use predicted probabilities
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I code the Cold War period as the years 1946-1991.
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below to illustrate the substantive impact of participation difference and sophistication
difference on the likelihood of that each type of alliance is formed. To account for dyadspecific relationships, I cluster standard errors by dyad.
[Table 3.2. about here]
Results and Discussion
Results from the logistic regression models in Table 3.2 indicate that the level of
societal participation in the military affects the likelihood that states establish formal
alliances. As participation difference decreases in value, the dyad is significantly more
likely to create a formal alliance. This result suggests that states pursue alliances with
states that have similar proportions of military personnel to the total population, which
supports Hypothesis 1. Figures 3.2-3.4 present the marginal effect of participation
difference and illustrate the consistent decline in (1) alliance formation, (2) defense pacts,
and (3) consultation pacts as the difference grows. In these figures, the x-axis represents
the range of the participation difference measure and the y-axis indicates the predicted
likelihood of a given alliance agreement. Looking at Figure 3.2, dyads with comparable
participation levels form alliances just under 0.24 percent of the time, while dyads with
high levels of differentiation only form alliances in about 0.06 percent of cases. Of the
dyads that formed alliances, 54.6 percent have a measure of participation difference
below the sample mean.59
[Figure 3.2 about here]
[Figure 3.3 about here]
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Table 3.1A in the Appendix presents models using participation difference as the only
measure of military organizations.
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[Figure 3.4 about here]
A similar finding occurs when considering each dyad’s sophistication difference.
As sophistication difference decreases, states are much more likely to form an alliance
agreement, which supports hypothesis 1. Figures 3.5-3.7 present the marginal effect of
troop sophistication and illustrate the consistent decline in the formation of (1) all
alliances, (2) defense pacts, and (3) consultation pacts as the difference grows
respectively. In these figures, the x-axis represents the range of the sophistication
difference measure and the y-axis indicates the predicted likelihood of a given alliance
agreement. The breadth of the curve represents a 95% confidence interval of predicted
values at a given measure of troop sophistication. I calculate predicted probabilities by
changing the values of the coalition structures, while holding all other variables at their
mean values. For example, based on Figure 3.5, dyads with minimal differences in troop
sophistication form alliances 0.23 percent of the time, while those with very different
troop sophistication form alliances with less than 0.06 percent likelihood. The importance
of this finding is evident when considering that alliance formation is a relatively rare
event.60 Specifically, 65.4 percent of the dyads that established an alliance had a value of
sophistication difference measuring below the sample mean.61
[Figure 3.5 about here]
[Figure 3.6 about here]
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Because alliances formation is an uncommon occurrence, I also use rare events logistic
regression. This method did not change the statistical or substantive results of the
statistical analyses (King and Zeng 2001). I include the rare event logit results in the
appendix (see Table 3.2A).
61
Table 3.3A in the Appendix presents models using sophistication difference as the only
measure of military organizations.
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[Figure 3.7 about here]
To elucidate the influence of military characteristics and alliance formation, I present the
example of the relationship of Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China during
the Cold War. In February 1950, these states entered into an alliance agreement that
entailed military support from signatories in any instance of aggression by Japan or one
of its allies (Cheng 2004). At this time, these states demonstrated a participation
difference of -4.081 and sophistication difference of 7.995, which is above the sample
mean for the former and well below the sample mean for the latter. These measures
indicate that the Sino-Soviet security pact included military organizations with similar
societal roles and personnel sophistication. Both parties upheld this contract until April
1980 when China refused to renew the alliance agreement in light of a deteriorating
political and military relationship (Cheng 2004).
The decision for China and the USSR to eliminate security ties was unexpected
considering that this dyad included two major powers with similar regime types and
comparable foreign policy portfolios at the height of the Cold War. Previous literature
would argue that these characteristics would be more than enough to foster a cooperative
relationship within the dyad. Yet, when considering the prospects of military
coordination, the data indicate considerable differences between Soviet and Chinese
armed forces had emerged over time. The size and sophistication of each state’s military
had changed considerably over the life of the alliance, largely resulting from domestic
economic reforms and shifts in foreign policy priorities (Cheng 2004).62 By 1980, this
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During this time, post-Mao leadership had adopted a number of reforms, including
establishing an economic relationship with the United States. At the same time, the
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dyad had a participation difference measure of -4.601 and a sophistication difference
measure of 10.723, which are both in the 75th percentile of the sample. These states
demonstrated common political institutions and mutual foreign policy interests, but such
means of cooperation were not enough to overcome substantial differences in their
military organizations.
Beyond characteristics of military organizations, I find that several control
variables significantly decrease the likelihood of alliance formation. Dyads are less likely
to form alliances as their regime types become more dissimilar. This result is consistent
with prior studies that indicate that states establish agreements with states sharing similar
domestic institutions (Crescenzi et al. 2012; Gibler and Wolford 2006; Leeds 1999).
States are also less likely to create alliances when the dyad consists of two democracies.
Interestingly, when observing defense pacts and consultation pacts exclusively, the
influence of joint democracy is no longer statistically significant. This finding may not
demonstrate an inability of democracies to cooperate and coordinate, but instead indicate
that democracies are capable of collaboration in the absence of a formal alliance
agreement (Leeds and Anac 2005). Apart from regime type, states are less likely to
establish alliances as the geographic distance between them increases.
A number of factors increase the likelihood of alliance agreements as well. Dyads
that share similar foreign policy interests are significantly more likely to engage in
alliance formation. Likewise, states that have recently participated in a militarized dispute
with a common third party are more likely to form an alliance. Mutual policy interests

Soviet Union faced challenges to its expansionist policies and prepared its personnel for
conflicts with the West and China (Cheng 2004).
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and a shared enemy create fertile ground for cooperative opportunities and incentivize
allied intervention in the presence of a crisis (Crescenzi et al. 2012; Lai and Reiter 2000).
The distribution of power influences alliance formation as well. Dyads that include at
least one major power as well as those occurring during the Cold War are significantly
more likely to create a formal alliance. The global interests of major powers, along with
the pressures of bipolarity in the Cold War each create motives for states to increase their
alliance networks (Lai and Reiter 2000; Waltz 1979).
The measures of time indicate that there is significant temporal dimension related
to alliance formation. The results do not indicate support for a linear effect of time, but
rather a non-linear relationship between time and alliance formation. Specifically, the
time-squared variable shows that there is an inverse u-shaped relationship, where adding
years to a dyad’s history increases the likelihood of alliance formation, but this effect
diminishes over time. This finding suggests that states can gather information about a
potential ally for a certain period, but reach a point where new information has a
declining influence on the likelihood of alliance formation. I demonstrate the structure of
this relationship in Figure 3.8 below.
[Figure 3.8 about here]
Conclusion
This study investigates characteristics states use to evaluate the capabilities and
merits of potential alliance agreements. Based on the statistical evidence, political leaders
are significantly more likely to establish alliances with states that have similar military
organizations. This finding is consistent for alliance agreements in general as well as
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defense pacts and consultation pacts in particular.63 Beyond developing a shared set of
goals, allies must also be capable of working together in order to implement alliance
terms. This means that leaders must simultaneously identify potential allies that have
comparable political institutions and foreign policy aspirations as well as military
organizations with similar practices, procedures, and capabilities. Completing such a task
is difficult even in highly cooperative situations because agreements on paper do not
necessarily translate into effective joint behaviors on the ground. Coordination not only
requires a higher degree of commitment between allies, but also necessitates that states
alter their military practices and capabilities to minimize the learning curve in joint
ventures. Having comparable militaries facilitates greater coordination because allies
require less of a learning curve to adjust actions in a deliberate and orderly fashion.
Moreover, the results support previous literature that argues that states prefer to work
alongside those that share similar domestic institutions and a mutual threat. Taken
together, these findings suggest that while interstate cooperation is an essential
component for identifying possible allies, scholars must also consider the prospects of
military coordination when investigating alliance formation behavior.64
Allies that have a cooperative relationship can improve coordination efforts by
institutionalizing commitments and reconciling differences in military organizations.
NATO exemplifies this behavior by standardizing training methods, weapons and pay
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While neutrality and non-aggression pacts do not require direct military coordination,
there is statistical evidence that differences in military organizations may also influence
the decision to form these types of alliances as well. See Table 3.2A in the Appendix.
64
Future research could address this issue by viewing alliance formation as a two-step
process in which states identify potential allies based on measures of cooperation, and
then select allies from this pool using metrics of potential coordination.
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grades for all members of the alliance (Bensahal 2007; Leeds and Anac 2005). While this
strategy may ensure a threshold of coordination among allies, it only occurs in the
presence of extensive cooperation and at a high cost to signatories. NATO has worked
toward these goals for over half a century, but it still struggles to achieve technical
interoperability and implement a universal standard of practices and procedures
(Bensahal 2007; Leeds and Anac 2005). As the number of alliance partners has swollen
to 28 states, the diversity in organizational structures and professional cultures of allied
militaries has made developing acceptable strategies and alliance goals an increasingly
difficult task (Leeds and Anac 2005; Weitsman 2014).
The findings of this study have meaningful policy implications because they
demonstrate that the degree to which a state prioritizes and invests in its armed forces not
only shapes the professional and organizational culture of the military, but also how other
states perceive it as a viable alliance partner. Similarity of interests is an essential first
step because states must be capable of cooperating if they intend to establish credibility
and deter outside aggression (Gibler 2008; Leeds and Anac 2005).65 If a cooperative
relationship is possible, states then evaluate whose militaries are capable of comparable
actions on and off the battlefield. In the absence of perfect information, traits such as the
number and professional character of military personnel serve as coordination metrics.
By altering investments in military training, technology, and professionalization
techniques, states shape the ability of the armed forces to produce the public good of
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Gibler (2008) and Leeds et al. (2000) note that the majority of alliances challenged by a
third party are those perceived as weak or dysfunctional.
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national security, while also changing how states perceive them as a compatible military
partner.

Copyright © Michael Andrew Morgan 2015

75

Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics

Participation Diff.
Participation Diff. (ln)
Sophistication Diff.
Sophistication Diff. (ln)
Joint Democracy
Regime Difference
Foreign Policy Similarity
Distance
Major Power
Mutual Threat
Time
Time-Squared
Cold War

N
753829
748094
552442
552293
650590
650590
647110
786518
786518
786518
786518
786518
786518

Mean
Std. Dev.
0.007
0.009
-5.576
1.302
24523.400 71374.880
8.403
2.238
0.169
0.375
7.728
6.273
0.759
0.189
4719.460 2796.850
0.102
0.302
0.013
0.115
0.485
0.499
30.735
29.626
1822.317 3856.436
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Min
0.000
-16.915
0.000
-5.329
0.000
0.000
-0.217
5.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
1.000

Max
0.211
-1.554
2416237.000
14.698
1.00
20.000
1.000
12347.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
192.000
36864.000

Table 3.2: Military Characteristics and Alliance Formation

Participation Difference (ln)
Sophistication Difference (ln)
Joint Democracy
Regime Difference
Foreign Policy Similarity
Distance
Major Power
Mutual Threat
Cold War
Time
Time-Squared
Constant
N
Log Likelihood
Chi2
AIC
BIC

All Alliances
-0.081***
(0.017)
-0.063***
(0.011)
-0.496***
(0.090)
-0.047***
(0.005)
3.587***
(0.287)
-0.001***
(0.001)
1.095***
(0.077)
0.657***
(0.105)
0.531***
(0.060)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.001**
(0.001)
-7.029***
(0.290)
437894
-9464.980
2185.951
18953.961
19085.838

Defense
-0.058***
(0.021)
-0.041***
(0.014)
-0.234**
(0.096)
-0.045***
(0.006)
3.749***
(0.374)
-0.001***
(0.001)
0.920***
(0.087)
0.623***
(0.122)
0.785***
(0.078)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.001*
(0.001)
-7.544***
(0.368)
437894
-6259.299
2186.409
12542.597
12674.474

Consultation
-0.121***
(0.018)
-0.125***
(0.012)
-0.034
(0.093)
-0.045***
(0.006)
3.509***
(0.328)
-0.001***
(0.001)
0.794***
(0.087)
0.719***
(0.111)
0.880***
(0.065)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.001)
-7.699***
(0.321)
437894
-7039.860
2423.758
14103.720
14235.597

Notes: Logistic regression.
The dependent variable is coded 1 for an alliance formed in a dyad-year and 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.
AIC and BIC assess fit and complexity of models. Smaller values indicate better model
fit.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
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Figure 3.1: Formal Alliance Agreements, 1816-2007

Note: This figure accounts for all alliance types.
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Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of Participation Difference on Alliance Formation (All)

Notes: The effect represents change in participation difference with all other
variables held at their mean. Because the values of participation difference fall
between 0 and 1, the natural log of these figures results in negative values. This
means that dyads with asimilar proportion of military participation are at the most
negative end of the scale, while those with the most dissimilar participation rates
are at the least negative end of the scale.
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Figure 3.3: Marginal Effect of Participation Difference on Alliance Formation (Defense)

Notes: The effect represents change in participation difference with all other
variables held at their mean. Because the values of participation difference fall
between 0 and 1, the natural log of these figures results in negative values. This
means that dyads with a similar proportion of military participation are at the
most negative end of the scale, while those with the most dissimilar participation
rates are at the least negative end of the scale.
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Figure 3.4: Marginal Effect of Participation Difference on Alliance Formation
(Consultation)

Notes: The effect represents change in participation difference with all other
variables held at their mean. Because the values of participation difference fall
between 0 and 1, the natural log of these figures results in negative values. This
means that dyads with a similar proportion of military participation are at the
most negative end of the scale, while those with the most dissimilar participation
rates are at the least negative end of the scale.

81

Figure 3.5: Marginal Effect of Sophistication Difference on Alliance Formation (All)

Notes: The effect represents change in sophistication difference with all other
variables held at their mean. Because some values of sophistication difference
fall between 0 and 1, the natural log of these figures results in negative values.
This means that dyads with the most similar rate of per solider spending are at the
negative end of the scale, while those with the most dissimilar participation rates
are at the positive end of the scale.
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Figure 3.6: Marginal Effect of Sophistication Difference on Alliance Formation
(Defense)

Notes: The effect represents change in sophistication difference with all other
variables held at their mean. Because some values of sophistication difference
fall between 0 and 1, the natural log of these figures results in negative values.
This means that dyads with the most similar rate of per solider spending are at the
negative end of the scale, while those with the most dissimilar participation rates
are at the positive end of the scale.
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Figure 3.7: Marginal Effect of Sophistication Difference on Alliance Formation
(Consultation)

Notes: The effect represents change in sophistication difference with all other
variables held at their mean. Because some values of sophistication difference
fall between 0 and 1, the natural log of these figures results in negative values.
This means that dyads with the most similar rate of per solider spending are at the
negative end of the scale, while those with the most dissimilar participation rates
are at the positive end of the scale.
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Figure 3.8: Relationship of Time-Squared and Alliance Formation

Note: The figure demonstrates a nonlinear effect of time on the likelihood of
alliance formation.
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Chapter 4: UN Interventions and Peacekeeper Fatalities
As the Cold War drew to an end, the United Nations (UN) expanded the scope of
its peacekeeping operations beyond “traditional” roles and began intervening in conflicts
that maintained active hostilities (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004; Fortna and
Howard 2008).66 An early test for this new brand of peacekeeping arose in early 1993
with the establishment of the Second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). Coming
on the heels of a U.S.-led intervention in war-torn Somalia (UNITAF), this mission
consisted of nearly 30,000 peacekeeping personnel provided by 35 member states (Clarke
and Herbst 1996; O’Neill and Rees 2005). The sheer size and scope of the mission not
only reflected the resolve of the international community, but also provided enough
military and police personnel to engage belligerent parties aggressively.
Despite its endowment of resources and boots on the ground, the conditions of
UNOSOM II deteriorated quickly. In early June 1993, militia forces commanded by
Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aideed ambushed and brutally murdered 24
Pakistani peacekeepers (Clarke and Herbst 1996). That October, an attempt to capture
Aideed led to a bloody firefight that brought about the deaths of 18 American soldiers, a
Malaysian peacekeeper, and more than 300 Somali militia members and civilians
(O’Neill and Rees 2005).67 What once appeared as an opportunity to stabilize the fragile

Traditional peacekeeping refers to a response “to interstate crises by stationing
unarmed or lightly armed UN forces between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop
withdrawal, or buffer zone while political negotiations went forward” (Doyle and
Sambanis 2006: 12).
67
The US Army Rangers killed in the Battle of Mogadishu operated under the guise of
American commanders rather than conducting a UN-sanctioned operation (O’Neill and
Rees 2005). Beyond these Rangers, the United States also contributed over 3,400 troops
to UNOSOM II in 1993 (Perry and Smith 2013).
66
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situation in Somalia instead resulted in an unfulfilled mandate and 113 United Nations
peacekeepers killed in the line of duty.68
More than 20 years removed from the Battle of Mogadishu, United Nations
peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have become increasingly complex, with contemporary
missions calling on peacekeeping forces to separate belligerent parties, enforce ceasefire
agreements, and protect the physical security of civilians and UN personnel (Bellamy et
al. 2004; Bellamy and Williams 2012; Hultman et al. 2013). United Nations interventions
disrupt the balance of power within a conflict zone by interceding between belligerent
parties and obstructing the policy goals of combatants (Ruggeri et al. 2012; Salverda
2013). As a result, belligerents have incentives to purposefully and violently target
peacekeepers in an attempt to reshape the strategic environment and encourage the UN to
withdraw from their mission (Ruggeri et al. 2012; Salverda 2013; Wood et al. 2012). In
light of this phenomenon, scholars suggest that that United Nations deploy larger
numbers of peacekeepers, specifically armed military and police contingents, so the
operation has personnel capable of creating a buffer zone between combatants and
punishing belligerents that continue to use violence (Hultman et al. 2013; Kathman 2013;
Wright and Greig 2012).
While the size and resources available to peacekeeping operations can shape the
legitimacy and capacity of the intervention, peacekeeping contingents must be able to
coordinate efforts if they are to meet mandated objectives and protect themselves from
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UNOSOM II experienced 82 peacekeeper fatalities in 1993, 30 fatalities in 1994, and 1
fatality in 1995 resulting from malicious acts of violence (United Nations 2014). The
events of October 1993 also spurred the withdrawal of Belgian, French, and Italian
contingents in early 1994 (O’Neill and Rees 2005).
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harm (Fortna 2004; Salverda 2013). Developing a resilient and unified presence in a
conflict zone is a considerable challenge because peacekeeping forces are ad hoc
coalitions of contingents volunteered by security organizations with different methods
and capabilities. Because each contributing state prepares personnel for peacekeeping
tasks according to its own standards and practices, those taking part in PKOs often adhere
to diverse standard operating procedures and demonstrate dissimilar battlefield aptitude.
In situations where peacekeeping partners are incapable of working together, personnel
lack the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, risk being perceived as inept, and fail
to restore order to the conflict zone no matter how many “blue helmets” are involved
(United Nations 2008). This means that the degree of intra-coalition differences affects
the ability of peacekeepers to convey credible threats, separate belligerent actors, and
protect their own lives. Therefore, how do organizational differences within
peacekeeping coalitions influence the likelihood and magnitude of peacekeepers killed
deliberately by belligerent actors?
To evaluate peacekeeping coalitions, I focus on the organizational structures of
security forces that contribute personnel to an operation. Organizational structure refers
to the internal pattern of relationships, authority, and communication, so variation of
these traits within a peacekeeping coalition influences the time and effort necessary to
construct strategies, aggregate resources, and execute operations (Fredrickson 1986;
Heidenrich 1994; Weitsman 2003, 2014). I theorize that coalition partners that function
under similar organizational structures are able to coordinate efforts effectively and in
turn demonstrate the aptitude necessary to deter malicious attacks by belligerent parties.
Through the analysis of UN peacekeeping operations from 1990-2013, I find that
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peacekeeping coalitions sharing similar organizational traits have their personnel killed at
a significantly lower rate and magnitude. This finding suggests that United Nations
leadership must consider characteristics of state security organizations before
constructing peacekeeping coalitions and deploying personnel into a conflict zone.
This chapter begins by framing United Nations peacekeeping operations as
coalition efforts and identifying how these interventions can incentivize violence toward
peacekeepers. Second, I consider the challenges facing the UN in terms of recruiting and
maintaining a sizable and capable peacekeeping force. Next, I present a theoretical
explanation of how the organizational differences among peacekeeping contingents affect
coordination and influence the propensity of combatants to target peacekeepers
deliberately. Then, I employ statistical analyses to evaluate how characteristics of
peacekeeping coalitions influence the likelihood and magnitude of peacekeeper fatalities
in the conflict zone. Finally, I expound on the influence of organizational structure and
posit how the United Nations can reconcile organizational idiosyncrasies in ongoing and
future peacekeeping operations.
Peacekeepers as Targets of Violence
Scholars conceptualize war as a bargaining process in which adversaries engage
in hostilities due to information disparities and credible commitment problems (Fearon
1995; Walter 2002). In this framework, adversaries calculate the probability of winning a
conflict and select their behavior based on the payoffs of reaching a settlement in the
present compared to fighting for a more favorable outcome in the future (Fearon 1995;
Regan 2000, 2002). Belligerent actors have incentives to retain private information about
their commitment to the contested issue, so combatants make decisions in an uncertain
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environment (Fearon 1995; Walter 2002, 2009). This uncertainty makes conflict difficult
to escape because belligerents do not want to risk accepting a suboptimal bargain or
negotiating a settlement that cannot be enforced (Fearon 1995; Walter 2002, 2009).
Third-party interventions alter the domestic balance of power and complicate the
bargaining process by introducing a new obstacle for policy outcomes desired by
belligerent parties (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008; Kathman and Wood 2011; Wood et al.
2012).69 Despite attempts to intervene as an impartial third party, intercession by the
United Nations presents a clear threat to combatant objectives, which allows
peacekeepers to become targets of violent acts (Clarke and Herbst 1996; Salverda 2013).
Scholars and policy-makers often view the concepts of neutrality and impartiality as
synonymous, but the former refers to a passive indifference, while the latter indicates the
participant takes an active role seeking a just outcome (Salverda 2013; United Nations
2008). This becomes more than a semantic argument when considering that the
Handbook of United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations defines
impartiality as “an objective and consistent execution of the mandate, regardless of
provocation or challenge…” (United Nations 2003: 56). In fact, the United Nations
argues that failure to implement the mandate at all costs risks undermining the credibility
and legitimacy of the entire mission (United Nations 2008). This perspective suggests
that UN personnel cannot claim to be neutral because they actually serve as “referees”
that penalize infractions of international norms and principles established by the United
Nations (Clapham 1998; United Nations 2008, 2009).

Interventions affect the state of conflict by lessening the combatants’ capacity to police
the population, disrupting their ability to funnel resources to potential supporters, and
discouraging civilian support for hostile parties (Wood et al. 2012).
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Peacekeepers that intercede in hopes of facilitating a just outcome may have to
side with the weaker party in order to level the playing field (Clapham 1998). Such
behavior is addressed by the Handbook of United Nations Multidimensional
Peacekeeping Operations, which notes that “[peacekeepers] must actively pursue the
implementation of their mandate even if doing so goes against the interest of one or more
of the parties” (United Nations 2003: 56). By aligning themselves with one of the
belligerent groups, even on a temporary basis, peacekeepers disrupt the local balance of
power and become participants in a hostile domestic bargaining process (Pouligny 2006;
Ruggeri et al. 2012; Salverda 2013). This disruption provides incentives for belligerents
to remove the PKO from the conflict zone, especially for the group that has the most at
stake (Salverda 2013; United Nations 2008, 2009).70 As a result, belligerent parties have
incentives to target peacekeepers with deliberate acts of violence in order to destabilize
the operation, force peacekeepers to remain close to their base, or even remove the
foreign presence altogether (Kathman and Wood 2011;Ruggeri et al. 2012; Salverda
2013; Wright and Greig 2012).
Peacekeepers risk death by entering an active conflict zone, but malicious acts of
violence are often tactfully premeditated. For example, during UNOSOM II the ambush
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Belligerent parties will only adopt less violent strategies if they recognize that the
intervener is resolved to end the conflict, has the capacity to punish factions that shirk on
agreements, and is able to offer alternative policies to resolve incompatibilities among
combatants (Kathman and Wood 2011). In this environment, a third-party intermediary
serves as a guarantor of sorts and allows combatants to disclose private information
regarding their capabilities, preferences, and resolve to one another (Regan and Aydin
2006, Walter 2009). By effectively separating combatants and discouraging open
conflict, UN interventions can provide belligerents with an opportunity to develop a
mutually acceptable solution without fear of becoming vulnerable in the post-conflict
period (Fearon 1995; Regan and Aydin 2006; Walter 2002, 2009).
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and murder of Pakistani peacekeepers in June 1993 took place after the Pakistanis began
inspecting authorized weapon storage sites (AWSS) following a survey of the area by
American forces (Alexander 2013; O’Neill and Rees 2005). The Somali militants
selected their targets based on a perception that the Pakistani forces lacked discipline and
aptitude, and because they did not want to risk a failed, bloody engagement with U.S.
personnel (Alexander 2013; O’Neill and Rees 2005).71 Based on this incident, it is not
just the sheer size of a peacekeeping operation, but also the characteristics of contributing
contingents that influence whether or not peacekeepers become victims of violent acts.
Peacekeeper deaths have been relatively rare events, but because even one fatality cause
peacekeepers to restrict their activities or leave the operation altogether, it is important to
indicate when and how often peacekeeper deaths occur. Figure 4.1 indicates the number
of peacekeeper fatalities during UN PKOs from 1990-2013.
[Figure 4.1 about here]
Peacekeeping Operations as Coalitions of the Willing
Rapid growth of peacekeeping operations at the end of the Cold War spurred an
abundance of research focusing on the ability of PKOs to mitigate violence and restore
order in the conflict zone (Fortna and Howard 2008). This wave of literature is plagued
with inconsistencies, as some studies argue that peacekeeping is incapable of preventing
hostilities or establishing a durable peace (Diehl et al. 1996; Jett 2001), while others
claim that peacekeeping operations are successful under certain circumstances (Doyle
and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Recent studies attempt to
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The UN gave the Somali militia twelve hours of notice before commencing the
inspection of the AWSS. The Somalis replied that they would respond to an inspection
with acts of aggression (O’Neill and Rees 2005).
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reconcile these differences by accounting for the diversity of peacekeeping operations in
terms of personnel commitments and force capacity (Hultman et al. 2013; Kathman
2013). This line of research highlights how the number and type of contingents shape the
perception and activities of a given operation. In terms of limiting civilian deaths,
numerically larger operations have better prospects for success because they are
adequately equipped to intervene between warring factions, generate an effective buffer
zone, and convince belligerents that future attempts at violence will be obstructed
(Hultman et al. 2013; Kathman 2013). This finding suggests that PKOs with considerable
numbers of armed military and police units have the training and equipment necessary to
deter and repel violence by belligerent parties (Hultman et al. 2013).
The United Nations recognizes that size and type of contingents deployed
influences its ability to amass resources and project a signal of legitimacy to the
international community.72 Constructing peacekeeping operations is a difficult task for
the UN because it does not maintain its own standing security force, but instead relies
upon personnel volunteered and trained by member states (Holt et al. 2009). What is
more, peacekeeping operations differ from conventional conflict situations because
consequences of the mission do not directly influence the survival and security of the
contributing states (Glenn 2011). This environment often leads to relatively weak
commitments from peacekeeper contributors alongside explicit caveats that dictate when,
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Large PKOs also indicate a high level of UN resolve because these missions are visible
to domestic and international audiences and are more difficult to withdraw due to sunk
political costs (Hultman et al. 2013).
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where, and how their personnel can be employed (Glenn 2011; Saiderman and Auerswald
2012).73
The transient nature of ties that bind peacekeeping operations together enable
contributor states to terminate their participation at any point in which perceived costs
exceed the benefits associated with continued membership (Glenn 2011). This means that
changes in mission mandate or the fickleness of state leadership can lead to a fluctuation
in personnel and contributor states involved, but the composition of peacekeeping
operations also responds to the ebb and flow of hostilities in the conflict zone (Clarke and
Herbst 1996; Hultman et al. 2013; Salverda 2013). For instance, because the
governments contributing forces are sensitive to the risks of peacekeeper fatalities, the
United Nations has implemented rules of engagement that place restrictions on
peacekeepers’ use of offensive actions in an attempt to reduce their exposure to direct
hostilities with belligerents (Bellamy et al. 2004; Holt et al. 2009; Saiderman and
Auerswald 2012).74 An oft-cited example of this policy includes the need to use a
gradation to the use of deadly force, even when the threat appears imminent, by requiring
peacekeepers to shout verbal warning to belligerents before opening fire (Holt et al.
2009; Saiderman and Auerswald 2012). Encouraging a conservative approach in the
conflict zone may be politically satisfying for contributor governments, but doing so
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The United Nations nominally controls all elements of the peacekeeping operation, but
its institutional limitations ensure each contingent has considerable leeway to act at its
own discretion and regularly communicate with their home government (Bellamy et al.
2004; United Nations 2008). More practically, if contributing states perceive UN
leadership as weak or the conflict environment as deteriorating, they may select to
withdraw their personnel from the operation (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).
74
Some state leaders think these conservative rules of engagement actually put
peacekeepers in greater danger (Saiderman and Auerswald 2012).
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limits the ability of peacekeeping commanders to adopt complex or robust operational
approaches (Holt et al. 2009).
Organizational Differences in Peacekeeping Coalitions
Research in the area of organizational ecology argues that organizations develop
through a life cycle that includes stages of birth, growth, maturity, revival and decline
(Chen 2014). In the early stages of this cycle, organizations achieve optimal efficiency
through rational, technocratic control embedded within a clearly defined command
structure and strict adherence to standard operating procedures (Adler and Borys 1996;
Aoki 1986; Fredrickson 1986; Glenn 2011; Soeters et al. 2010). Reliance on formalized
rules, standardized routines, and hierarchical control can dampen ambition for large-scale
innovations, but doing so allows organizations to use old certainties to improve their
performance in the short-run and avoid risks and costs endured during the trial-and-error
period most prominent in the first stage of the life cycle (Chen 2014; Horowitz 2011;
Kotter 2014). Thus, relatively young organizations require close management of rankand-file personnel, which delays communication, often causes means of communication
become sluggish and assessments to be ill informed, which can result in unnecessary
costs of blood and treasure (Adler and Borys 1996; Kotter 2014; Wilson 1989).
Through the accumulation of knowledge from prior experiences, mature
organizations are able to cultivate an operational history, develop expertise among
personnel, and formalize practices and procedures that support essential functions of the
organization (Adler and Borys 1996; Chen 2014; Horowitz 2011; Kotter 2014; Soeters et
al. 2010; Wilson 1989). With time and experience, organizations are able to develop best
practices, delegate discretionary authority, and encourage adaptation to complex and
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rapidly changing circumstances (Brooks 2007a; Soeters et al. 2010; Wilson 1989).
Moreover, mature organizations recognizes that effective actions by personnel are
contingent on their ability to use “on-the-spot” to deal with peculiarities on the ground
(Adler and Borys 1996; Aoki 1986; Brooks 2007a; Murray 2011; Soeters et al. 2010). 75
To encourage sophistication among its personnel, organizational leaders train their
members to understand the overarching purpose of strategies, operations, and tactics in
order to better comprehend how the actions of individual members fits into the larger
mission of the organization (Adler and Borys 1996; Aoki 1986; Kotter 2014).76 In order
for personnel to develop this type of sophistication, the organization must be able to
operate in a stable environment and develop best practices over a relatively long period of
time (Adler and Borys 1996; Kotter 2014).77
Organizational characteristics have direct implications for peacekeeping
operation, because each state’s peacekeepers will behave according to their respective
organizational practices. Specifically, the organizational structures of contributed forces
shape how personnel respond to authority, disseminate information, and adapt to highstress environments (Fredrickson 1986; Soeters et al. 2010; Wilson 1989). In a coalition
framework where each contributing state brings different skills, practices, and procedures
to the operation, the inability to coordinate maneuvers or establish a cohesive grand
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Depending on organizational memory can be beneficial in the short-run, but destructive
to an organization in the long term because an over-emphasis on previous experiences
can cause an organization to stop updating its knowledge base and refuse adopting
innovations (Chen 2014; Horowitz 2011).
76
These qualities fit definitions of professionalism described by Huntington (1957) and
Fredrickson (1986).
77
Prior studies indicate that organizations comprised of rational individuals with both
adequate experience and sufficient autonomy are better equipped to adapt strategies and
structures to fit rising environmental challenges (Chen 2014; Soeters et al. 2010).
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strategy can lead to ill-considered and poorly executed actions in the conflict zone (Glenn
2011; Millett et al. 1986, 1988; Murray 2011). Even if each member of the peacekeeping
coalition shares a common vision on political and security objectives, differences in
aptitude, training, and professional experience necessitate negotiation and
experimentation before variation can be reconciled and effective collaboration can occur
(Soeters et al. 2010; Weitsman 2003, 2014). In situations where there are vast differences
between partner capabilities and methods of behavior, the coalition expends considerable
efforts to accommodate its members rather than focusing on the mission mandate
(Bensahel 2007; Glenn 2011; Szayna et al. 2001). Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A. Silkett
recognizes the potential costs associated with intra-coalition differences when stating,
Cultural differences, subtle or substantial, may easily become debilitating
if not understood and appreciated. Differences in discipline, work ethic,
class distinctions, religious requirements, standards of living, traditions –
all can cause friction, misunderstanding, and cracks in cohesion (Silkett
1993, 79).78
As members of an ad hoc coalition, the organizational characteristics of volunteer forces
shapes how personnel prepare in terms of training and discipline as well as how they
work with others in an adapt-or-die scenario (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Gordon 2001).
Because each peacekeeping contingent has its own means and methods to construct
strategies and operations, having similar organizational structures within a coalition
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Lieutenant Colonel Wayne A. Silkett served as Associate Director of Military Strategy
in the Department of Corresponding Studies at the US Army War College (Silkett 1993).
He makes this statement with conventional military coalitions in mind, but it has merit
for peacekeeping coalitions that require military, police, and observer personnel to
coordinate operations (see United Nations 2008).
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provides an avenue to readily reconcile diverse abilities and reduce the learning curve
necessary to operate in a cohesive manner (Bensahel 2007; Heidenrich 1994; Millet et al.
1986).79 Peacekeeping coalitions comprised of contingents with diverse organizational
characteristics require time and effort to become acclimated with one another. In the
presence of considerable organizational differences, there is a heightened likelihood for
friction and misunderstandings among peacekeeping contingents, which threatens the
efficacy of actions in the conflict zone (Bensahel 2007; Brooks 2007a; Silkett 1993).
The inability to reconcile such differences not only presents challenges for intracoalition relationships, but also projects a signal of ineptitude that invites belligerent
parties to attack. Coordination difficulties were evident in UNOCI, where more than 50
member state contributed to the peacekeeping coalition.80 These contingents were highly
diverse in terms of experience, training, and organizational culture. Despite having a
sizable presence of nearly 10,000 security personnel on the ground during its tenure,
belligerents still targeted UNOCI forces, with 7 peacekeepers from Niger ambushed and
killed in June 2012 (Watkins 2012).
On the other hand, peacekeeping coalitions that overcome organizational
differences create the perception of a capable, competent, and unified group, which can
discourage malicious acts by belligerent parties. The benefits of sharing similar
organizational traits are evident in the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Jeffrey Pfeffer addresses this issue in saying, “People who share experiences and
attitudes are more likely to like each other because they will understand each other better,
and because liking someone who is similar is self-reinforcing as it ratifies one’s own
qualities…” (Pfeffer 1985: 69).
80
UNOCI refers to the United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast that began in April 2004
and is ongoing as of the writing of this article.
79
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(UNFICYP), where most of the peacekeeping personnel hail from stable and longstanding security organizations (O’Neill and Rees 2005). Specifically, the vast majority
of UNFICYP personnel have a shared experience with NATO practices and procedures,
which allows for smooth operations and limited hostilities from belligerent parties
(O’Neill and Rees 2005).81
One type of organizational structure is not necessarily better than another, but
combining contingents with dissimilar organizational characteristics can create
difficulties in terms of coordinating joint efforts (Luft 2009). Specifically, security forces
from relatively young organizations may have difficulty functioning side-by-side with
personnel that have an extensive operational history (Luft 2009; Weitsman 2003, 2014).
In cases where organizational structures differ substantively, there may not be sufficient
time for peacekeeping contingents to reconcile their differences and operate effectively.
Keeping this in mind, I anticipate that belligerents are more likely to use deliberate acts
of violence toward peacekeepers when peacekeeping operations are comprised of security
forces with dissimilar organizational structures. Likewise, I expect the number of
peacekeeper fatalities to increase when contributed forces hail from diverse
organizational cultures.
Hypothesis 1: As organizational structures become more diverse in a peacekeeping
coalition, the likelihood of peacekeeper fatalities will increase.
Hypothesis 2: As organizational structures become more diverse in a peacekeeping
coalition, the number of peacekeeper fatalities will increase.
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UNFICYP is an ongoing operation in Cyprus that began in 1964. Belligerent actors
have not killed any peacekeepers since 1981 despite a continued and sizable UN
presence.
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Peacekeeping forces face a unique challenge because the UN expects them to
operate as a unified entity despite being ad hoc coalitions of contingents from a variety of
organizational backgrounds. Fundamental differences in organizational characteristics
influence a coalition’s prospects for success because these traits translate into the nature
of communication within the command chain, the perception of group cohesion among
its members, and respect for the authority of the United Nations. Coalition partners that
remain at odds in terms of their organizational practices and procedures will have
considerable difficulty developing group cohesion or coordinate actions (Glenn 2011;
Weitsman 2014). If peacekeeping coalitions fail to reconcile these differences, the use of
violence becomes a viable tool for belligerent spoilers to force peacekeepers out of the
conflict zone (Ruggeri et al. 2012; Salverda 2013; United Nations 2008).
Research Design
The United Nations generally sends peacekeeping operations to dangerous and
desperate locales (Fortna 2004; United Nations 2008), so it is important to identify how
the characteristics of coalition contingents influence when peacekeepers become targets
of malicious violence. By directly engaging hostile actors, peacekeepers upset the
domestic balance of power and put themselves in the crosshairs of groups that lose the
most from an international presence (Hultman et al. 2013; Salverda 2013). Because
contemporary peacekeeping operations are often deployed to active, hostile conflict
zones, this study analyzes all United Nations peacekeeping operations from 1990-2013.82
The source, size, and type of personnel contributed to an operation changes throughout
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An abundance of literature explains that the number and conditions of UN PKOs has
changed dramatically since the drawdown of the Cold War (see Bellamy et al. 2004;
Fortna and Howard 2008; Kathman 2013)
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the life of a PKO, so a mission-year is the unit of analysis.83 This unit of analysis
identifies the influence of intra-coalition differences both within and across peacekeeping
operations. I compile the characteristics of each peacekeeping operation from the
International Peace Institute’s Peacekeeping Database (Perry and Smith 2013). Table 4.1
lists each UN mission included in the sample along with the total number of peacekeeper
fatalities during its tenure.
[Table 4.1 about here]
Dependent Variable
I create two variables that measure the degree of malicious acts experienced by
UN peacekeepers. These variables account for the likelihood that a peacekeeper is killed
because of deliberate violence, as well as the number of fatalities. The first variable,
fatality, is dichotomous and coded as 1 if one or more peacekeepers are killed within a
mission-year and coded 0 otherwise. This discrete variable indicates instances where
belligerents kill peacekeepers, but does not detail the scope of malicious violence facing
UN personnel. In order to identify the magnitude of peacekeeper fatalities in a conflict
zone, I create a second variable, fatality frequency, which provides a count of
peacekeepers killed within a given mission-year. I compile data used to assess violence
toward peacekeepers from United Nations documents recording peacekeeper fatalities on
an annual basis for each PKO (United Nations 2014). These data disaggregates fatalities
into categories of cause including illness, accidents, and malicious violence. Events
coded as malicious violence indicate that peacekeepers died after combatants
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The original IPI database is in mission-month format. Because information regarding
peacekeeper fatalities is most readily available and verifiable at an annual basis, I
collapse and convert the data to a mission-year format.
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purposefully and directly targeted them. For this reason, I only include malicious
fatalities in the analyses.
Independent Variable
Time, experience, and institutional stability are necessary for an organization to
formalize best practices, so the structure of a security apparatus is largely a product of its
ability to avoid large-scale disturbances that trigger a structural overhaul (Allison 1971;
Horowitz 2011). In the aftermath of major system changes, a state must reconsider and
revamp the structure of its security organization to adapt to new circumstances (Horowitz
2011). I measure the organizational structure of a state’s security apparatus through the
creation of the variable structure. Structure refers to the number of years that have passed
since a state experienced a severe disruptive event on either the domestic or the
international front.84 This measure is adapted from the “durable” variable in the Polity IV
dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2014) and is theoretically consistent with the calculation of
“organizational age” used by Horowitz (2011).85 Horowitz (2011) identifies major regime
change or a losing effort in an interstate war as events powerful enough to topple the
status quo structure of security organizations. 86 I modify this measure by also including
losses in intrastate conflict as well as the occurrence of a successful coup d’état as a
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Structure is calculated from a sample of all states from 1945-2013. I code states as 0 in
1945 or their first year of independence. This coding scheme is consistent with the
“durability” variable in the Polity IV dataset.
85
Scholars commonly address the concept of organizational age within the organizational
ecology literature (see Chen 2014), and it has been recently adapted to political science
research (see Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Horowitz 2011).
86
A regime change results if there is a change of three or more on the aggregate Polity
score (Marshall and Jaggers 2014).
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source of shock to a security organization.87 I derive the durability of each state’s
political regime using the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2014). I compile each
state’s experience with intrastate and interstate conflicts using version 4.0 of the
Correlates of War Intrastate Wars and Interstate Wars datasets (Sarkees and Wayman
2010).88 I record successful coups d’états using the 2013 version of the Center for
Systemic Peace’s Coup D’état Events dataset (Marshall and Marshall 2014).89
Peacekeeping operations are multinational coalition efforts, so the ability of
peacekeepers to coordinate efforts depends on the organizational compatibility among
coalition members. To address intra-coalition relationships, I create a variable, coalition
structures, which calculates the dispersion of structure within each peacekeeping
coalition (i.e., mission-year) using the coefficient of variation. The coefficient of
variation (CV) is a measure of dispersion that represents the ratio of a variable’s standard
deviation to its mean (Allison 1978). The CV is an appropriate measure of variability
because it allows for comparison among observations (i.e., coalitions) that have
considerably different dispersions and means (Allison 1978).90 Based on this measure,
peacekeeping coalitions with high values of coalition structures represent diverse
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I exclude intrastate conflicts that involve third-party interveners (i.e., internationalized
wars).
88
The Correlates of War Data are used because they establish a high threshold for
conflict (i.e., battle deaths), which indicates a conflict of sufficient magnitude to spur
organizational change in the military or national police.
89
I selected this dataset because of its coverage of years 1945-2013 and because it has
been cross-referenced with other datasets, including Powell and Thyne (see Marshall and
Marshall 2014).
90
Because the standard deviation and mean have the same unit of measure, their ratio
creates a unit free measure than allows comparison among observations (Allison 1978).
Using other measures, such as variance or standard deviation would not allow for
comparisons among groups with different means and/or standard deviations (Allison
1978).
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organizational characteristics among partner contingents, while low values of coalition
structures indicate coalition partners that have similar organizational traits.
To provide more clarity on this measure, I use the United Nations Observer
Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT) as an example. In 1994, UNMOT involved a coalition
of 5 states including Austria, Bangladesh, Denmark, Jordan, and Uruguay.91 The value of
structure for each of these security organizations is 48, 3, 49, 5, and 9 respectively. The
average value for structure for this coalition is equal to 22.8, while the standard deviation
is approximately 23.563. When dividing the standard deviation by the mean, the
coefficient of variation for this coalition results in a value of 1.033. The CV indicates that
the UNMOT coalition experienced variability in its organizational structures at a level of
103%. This measure not only indicates the degree of structural variation in the UNMOT
coalition, but also serves as a metric of structural variability that allows comparisons
among all peacekeeping coalitions.
Peacekeeping coalitions with a low degree of variability in terms of
organizational structure require less of a learning curve to reconcile differences among
contributing states, which should allow them to perform better in the conflict zone. An
example of a low variability coalition is the group of contributing states in Pakistan
(UNMOGIP) in 1993. The structure measure for these coalition partners ranges from 4
(Chile) to 48 (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) and the coefficient of
variation for this coalition is 0.519. On the other end of the spectrum, an example of a
high variability coalition is the group of contributors in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in
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The United Nations established UNMOT in 1994 to monitor the ceasefire agreement
between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (Jett 2001).
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2000. The structures within this coalition range from 0 (Croatia, Senegal, and the Russian
Federation) to 55 (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), which
results in a CV of 1.126. These examples demonstrate that coalition partners in Pakistan
experienced 52% variability, while coalition partners in Sierra Leone had 113%
variability in terms of organizational structure. This indicates that the peacekeeping
partners in UNMOGIP had relatively similar organizational structures, while the coalition
in UNAMSIL had contingents operating under highly differentiated organizational
structures. Figure 4.2 illustrates the distribution of coalition structures in the sample.
[Figure 4.2 about here]
Control Variables
Recent research suggests that the number and type of contingents devoted to a
peacekeeping operation signal the resolve of the United Nations and define the
capabilities of the mission (Hultman et al. 2013; Salverda 2013). Military personnel often
enforce peace agreements, intercede between combatant parties, and in some cases,
punish belligerents for continuing transgressions in the aftermath of a negotiated
settlement (Kathman 2013). Police units also operate near the battlefield, but focus on
providing security through monitoring and protecting civilian populations in areas where
the rule of law remains absent (Kathman 2013). Furthermore, military observers
participate in the operation by assessing the progress of negotiations, political reforms,
and ceasefire agreements (Kathman 2013). I use data from the International Peace
Institute’s Peacekeeping Database to create three variables that indicate the average
number of military, police, and observer personnel in a given mission-year (Perry and
Smith 2013). I divide personnel figures by 100 in order to capture the influence of 100
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military, police, and observer contingents in a given mission-year. I present the
descriptive statistics of peacekeeping contingent types in Table 4.2 below.
[Table 4.2 about here]
The desire to amass adequate resources and gain legitimacy within the
international community encourages the United Nations to recruit contingents from as
many states as possible (Glenn 2011). Despite differences in capabilities, a wide-reaching
coalition can potentially reach objectives at a lower cost than if states addressed them
unilaterally (Glenn 2011; Weitsman 2014). The relative influence and power of
contributing states indicates the importance of the mission to the United Nations and the
international community at large. Participation by permanent members of the Security
Council (P5) signals the resolve of major powers and solidifies the perception that
peacekeepers will have the resources and experience necessary for the mission at hand
(Voeten 2005).92 Likewise, contributor states that share a geographic region with the
mission state have an inherent interest in restoring order to avoid lapses in relationships
(e.g., trade) or the contagion effect of conflict (Beardsley 2011; Buhaung and Gleditsch
2008). To capture the source of contributing states, I use the International Peace
Institute’s Peacekeeping Database to create two variables that denote the average number
of (1) P5 and (2) regional states that participate in a given mission-year (Perry and Smith
2013).93 Table 4.2 indicates that peacekeeping missions experience a variety of
participation from P5 and regional members, with about 2 states in each category
contributing on average.
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P5 participation also addresses the notion that most PKOs lack adequate funding and
capabilities (Bellamy et al. 2004; Berman and Sams 2000; Gordon 2001).
93
I classify states into regions based on categories used by the United Nations (2013).
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Previous literature has shown that belligerent parties have greater incentive to use
violent acts in the presence of an intense and divisive conflict (Hultman 2007; Wood
2010; Wood et al. 2012). To account for the conflict environment, I create two variables
that indicate the (1) severity of the dispute and (2) the strength of non-state combatants.
To operationalize the severity of a conflict, I use the natural log of the number of battlerelated deaths during a given mission-year (see Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Wood et al.
2012). I compile battle-related deaths from v.5-2014 of the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths
Dataset (Sundberg 2008). The second variable indicates the fighting capacity of non-state
combatants relative to the government. This measure is an ordinal variable capturing the
strength of rebel groups based on their ability to procure arms and maintain an active
fighting force. I code this variable on a scale of 0 to 3 for each mission-year according to
version 3.4 of the Non State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset (Cunningham et al. 2009).
The strongest non-state actors are coded as 3, while the absence of non-state actors is
coded as 0.94
Peacekeepers may also experience a greater level of violence during the initial
stage of a peacekeeping operation. Because belligerent parties cannot perceive the
intentions and resolve of peacekeepers during the early months of the intervention,
combatants have incentives to target UN personnel in hopes of disrupting peacekeeping
activities and forcing the United Nations to withdraw its mission (Salverda 2013; Wright
and Greig 2012). What is more, belligerents are likely to challenge PKOs in the early
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The ordinal categories include (0) no rebels, (1) low, (2) moderate, (3) high rebel
capacity. This variable is highly correlated with the rebel strength variable also included
in the Non State Actors in Armed Conflict Dataset. Where there are multiple non-state
actors, I code the variable as the highest capacity among the rebel groups.
107

stages of deployment because it takes peacekeepers time to address the lawlessness and
insecurities in the conflict zone (United Nations 2008). Thus, I create a dichotomous
variable coded as 1 to indicate the first year of the peacekeeping mission.95
Statistical Models
The first set of statistical analyses focus on the likelihood that peacekeepers fall
victim to malicious violent attacks. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I
employ logistic regression. Logistic regression models the log odds of the dependent
variable as a linear combination of the predictor variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).
The logistic regression results indicate the change in the log odds of a peacekeeper
fatality for a one-unit increase in a given variable. I use predicted probabilities below to
illustrate the substantive impact of coalition structure on the likelihood of peacekeeper
fatalities. To account for the fact that coalitions within a given PKO are unlikely
independent from one another, I cluster standard errors by peacekeeping operation.
To evaluate the number of peacekeepers killed by malicious acts, the second set
of analyses utilizes negative binomial regression. A Poisson model is often used for count
data, but if this model is used in the presence of over-dispersed data, the standard errors
can be biased and be too small (Vuong 1989). The descriptive statistics in Table 4.2
indicate that fatality frequency has a variance that exceeds the mean, so a negative
binomial model that accounts for over-dispersion is the correct choice (Vuong 1989).96
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If multiple missions occur in a state during the same year, I code the first year of each
mission as 1 because each mission has a unique mandate, force size, and coalition
composition.
96
Some scholars argue that that the presence of over-dispersion and excessive zeroes in
the dependent variable makes a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression more
appropriate (Vuong 1989). An underlying assumption of ZINB regression is that separate
processes lead to zeroes in the data, and this does not seem applicable in the present
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Once again, I cluster standard errors by peacekeeping operation, and use predicted
probabilities below to illustrate the substantive impact of coalition structure on the
number of peacekeeper fatalities.
Results and Discussion
Results from the logistic regression models in Table 4.3 indicate that
organizational structures within a peacekeeping coalition significantly affect the
likelihood that peacekeepers are victims of violent acts.97 As the variability of coalition
structures increases, peacekeepers are significantly more likely to experience fatal
attacks, which supports hypothesis 1. Figure 4.3 presents the marginal effect of coalition
structures and illustrates a steady increase in the likelihood of peacekeeper fatalities as
the variability grows.98 The x-axis represents the range of the coalition structures
measure and the y-axis indicates the predicted likelihood of peacekeeper fatalities, while
the breadth of the curve represents a 95% confidence interval of predicted values at a
given measure of coalition structures. I calculate predicted probabilities by changing the
values of the coalition structures, while holding all other variables at their mean values.
Based on Figure 4.3, coalitions at the low end of the variability scale endure peacekeeper
fatalities less than 10 percent of the time, while those with highly differentiated partner
organizations experience peacekeeper deaths at nearly a 30 percent likelihood. This

study. ZINB regressions specifying the presence of an ongoing conflict in the logistic
regression stage yields findings statistically and substantively similar to negative
binomial regressions.
97
This finding is robust across various model specifications. Recognizing that
peacekeeper fatalities are relatively uncommon, I also specified models using rare event
logistic regression in the Appendix (see King and Zeng 2001), and this did not change the
statistical or substantive results.
98
Figures 4.2A and 4.3A in the Appendix provide first differences plots for variables in
Model 4 and Model 8 (King et al. 2000; King et al. 2001; Tomz et al. 2003).
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finding is quite important when considering that the vast majority of peacekeeping
coalitions demonstrate a relatively high degree of variability in terms of coalition
structures. Specifically, of the 97 mission-years that experienced peacekeeper fatalities,
76 coalitions had a coefficient of variation greater than the sample mean.
[Table 4.3 about here]
[Figure 4.3 about here]
The negative binomial models in Table 4.4 also indicate that variability in
organizational structures significantly increases the number of peacekeepers killed in the
line of duty, which supports hypothesis 2. Figure 4.4 illustrates the marginal effect of
coalition structures, with the predicted number of peacekeeper fatalities increasing as
structural variability grows. Looking at Figure 4.4, coalitions with low levels of
organizational variation are predicted to lose about .1 peacekeeper, while those with
considerable variation are projected to have approximately 0.6 peacekeeper killed. At
first glance, the influence of organizational structures appears irrelevant, with even highly
diverse coalitions predicted to lose less than one peacekeeper to malicious violence. The
significance of this finding is more apparent when considering belligerents rarely kill
large numbers of UN personnel, regardless of the operation. In fact, of the 97 missionyears experiencing peacekeeper fatalities, 45 mission-years featured a single peacekeeper
death and only 12 mission-years had double-digit fatalities. Therefore, because even a
small magnitude of peacekeeper deaths may encourage states to restrict actions of its
contingents or withdraw their forces from the peacekeeping operation, minimizing
organizational variability is critical.
[Table 4.4 about here]
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[Figure 4.4 about here]
These results from these models are more comprehensible when applied to a
historical case. 99 Returning to UNOSOM II, the peacekeeping coalition in this operation
featured contributions from heterogeneous organizational structures such as Bangladesh,
Norway, Romania, and Tunisia, and the United States. Government officials and those in
the media initially touted the merits of this mission due in part to its diversity of
participants (Clarke and Herbst 1996; O’Neill and Rees 2005). Despite having a broad,
“globally representative” coalition, incompatibility among peacekeeping partners led to
slow decision-making, appointment of unqualified personnel, and an ineffective chain of
command (Clarke and Herbst 1996). This dysfunction carried over to the conflict zone
where UN officials disproportionately leaned on the United States to provide military and
logistical support and largely failed to communicate clear objectives to other participating
contingents (O’Neill and Rees 2005). Such behavior demonstrated a clear lack of a united
front, which invited belligerent parties in Somalia to strike the coalition at its weakest
points.
These anecdotes find support in the data, which confirm that the UNOSOM II
peacekeeping coalition embodied considerable variation in terms of coalition structures.
In the presence of 82 peacekeeper deaths during 1993, the measure of coalition structures
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The relationship between coalition variability and peacekeeper fatalities also remains
consistent across both time and space. For example, UNMIS endured peacekeeper
fatalities in 3 of its 7 years of operation, UNAVEM II-III experienced peacekeeper deaths
in 4 of 7 years, and MONUC suffered fatalities in 8 of 10 years. UNMIS was conducted
in Sudan from 2005-2011, UNAVEM operations were conducted in Angola from 19911997, and MONUC operated in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1999-2010.
Each of these cases included military, police, and observer contingents. In each of these
missions, almost all instances of peacekeeper fatalities occurred when the coalition
variability surpassed the sample mean.
111

is 0.725, which indicates there were substantial organizational differences among
coalition partners. The next year, coalition structures increased to 0.836 and belligerents
killed another 30 peacekeepers. In 1995, coalition structures decreased to a value of
0.937, and belligerents killed an additional peacekeeper. The peacekeeping coalition in
Somalia appeared unable to reconcile organizational differences among its contingents
and was unable to reach mandated goals or protect the lives of its personnel.
In addition to organizational characteristics, the models also indicate that the size
and type of personnel deployed to a conflict zone influence the likelihood and frequency
of peacekeeper fatalities. This finding is consistent with previous literature that indicates
that a large peacekeeping presence provides more targets for belligerents, and in turn,
increased peacekeeper fatalities (Salverda 2013). Specifically, as the number of armed
military personnel increase, both the likelihood and magnitude of peacekeeper fatalities
increase. Because armed military personnel are most equipped to engage belligerent
actors (Hultman et al. 2013; Kathman 2013), belligerents are most likely to view them as
a threat to the domestic balance of power and engage in violent skirmishes with military
contingents as a result. On the other hand, as the number of observers increases, the
frequency of peacekeeper fatalities declines. Peacekeepers that serve exclusively as
observers lack the mandate, equipment, and capacity to directly engage or deter
belligerent parties (Hultman et al. 2013; Kathman 2013). Belligerents are aware of these
limitations and are unlikely to view them as a substantial barrier to per-intervention
policy goals. Thus, belligerents lack incentive to attack purposefully UN personnel in the
presence of observers who cannot intercede among combatants or affect events in the
conflict zone in a meaningful way.
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The statistical analyses also specify that the presence of non-state actors and well
as multiple rebel groups increases the number of peacekeeper fatalities. This finding is
consistent with prior research that demonstrates that strong rebel groups are more likely
to escalate violence toward peacekeepers in an attempt to restrict peacekeeper activities
or remove the foreign presence altogether (Salverda 2013; Wright and Greig 2012).
Previous literature shows that belligerent parties have greater incentive to utilize violence
in the presence of divisive and intense conflicts because these conditions make reaching a
mutually acceptable settlement highly difficult (Fearon 1995; Hultman 2007; Walter
2002; Wood 2010; Wood et al. 2012). If peacekeepers stand in the way of a belligerent
party from capturing resources or gaining an advantage with in the delicate domestic
power struggle, UN personnel become viable targets of violence. Therefore, where
multiple hostile parties have resources and grievance, belligerents are much more likely
to target peacekeepers with malicious acts of violence.
Conclusion
The present study indicates that organizational differences among peacekeeping
contingents influence likelihood and magnitude that belligerents purposefully target and
kill United Nations peacekeepers. Specifically, as the variability of organizational
structures increases within peacekeeping coalitions, both the likelihood and frequency of
peacekeeper fatalities increase significantly. These results indicate that in addition to the
number and type of contingents deployed, the United Nations must also consider how the
combination of diverse security organizations translate into coordinated efforts in the
conflict zone. A peacekeeping coalition with relatively similar organizational structures
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requires less of a learning curve to reconcile its differences, aggregate resources, and
coordinate actions, than coalitions with organizationally diverse contingents.
Returning to the opening example, the mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) serves
as a prime example of coalition dysfunction, where the United Nations 113 peacekeepers
deliberately killed in the line of duty despite having nearly 30,000 personnel volunteered
by a broad multinational coalition. Coalition forces in Somalia were unable to develop
cohesion in part because of UN leadership leaning heavily on the United States for
logistical support, and as a result, the U.S. refused to work closely with other
peacekeeping contingents (O’Neil and Rees 2005). This asymmetric burden-sharing
agreement became more costly after the United States withdrew its personnel in 1994,
leaving the remaining coalition members without necessary resources or a clear
command and control infrastructure (O’Neil and Rees 2005). This example demonstrates
that UN leadership must not only consider the sheer size of a peacekeeping operation, but
also how organizational differences among coalition members helps or hinders their
ability to collaborate effectively.
The need to consider organizational structures when constructing peacekeeping
coalitions presents a considerable challenge to the United Nations because it has virtually
no say over who offers personnel for a particular peacekeeping mission or how states
train their contingents. The best option for UN leadership is to focus on integrating
contingents that come from similar organizational and professional backgrounds, rather
than cobble together broad peacekeeping coalitions with diverse practices and
procedures. Such efforts appear to be taking place in the ongoing mission in Iraq
(UNAMI), where coalition partners display low variability in terms of coalition

114

structures and belligerents have not killed any peacekeepers from 2006-2013. Taking this
a step further, the UN could codify and standardize a peacekeeping training regimen for
its member states.100 Each member state would still have the final decision of whether or
not to incorporate and institutionalize such standards, but this would provide a
mechanism to improve collaboration among peacekeepers, regardless of their respective
domestic circumstances or experiences with warfare.101 In other words, United Nations
officials may be able to construct effective coalitions by combining security personnel
with similar organizational cultures and professional traditions.
The organizational attributes of coalition partners may also offer insights
regarding the effectiveness of conventional military alliances and coalitions. Much like
peacekeeping operations, multilateral military efforts have become more common since
the end of the Cold War (Morey 2015; Sillket 1993). Moreover, alliances and coalitions
are often used in order to obtain legitimacy from the international community and more
practically, to aggregate the resources of multiple states (Glenn 2011; Weitsman 2003,
2014). Allied states may share an interest in neutralizing a mutual threat and devote
considerable resources toward the mission, but if partner states fail to reconcile
organizational and professional differences, such as aligning standard operating
procedures and rules of engagement, they will not be able to counter an enemy
effectively (Gordon 2001; Saiderman and Auerswald 2012; Weitsman 2003, 2014).

100

This method may be a necessary first step to institutionalize predictable behaviors and
codify best practices (Adler and Borys 1996).
101
There are currently attempts to enforce standards of training, capabilities, and
equipment for peacekeepers, but this states that cannot endure increased procurement
costs associated with standardization of best practices are resisting (Bellamy and
Williams 2012).
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Allied militaries that function under similar organizational structures need less time to
become acclimated with each other, and they require less of a learning curve to aggregate
resources during joint operations. Accounting for organizational structures may elucidate
why some coalitions fail despite having the advantage of resources and a history of
collaboration, while others are able to overcome such deficiencies over time.
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Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-2013
Mission
MINUCI
MINUGUA
MINURCA
MINURCAT
MINURSO
MINUSMA
MINUSTAH
MIPONUH
MONUA
MONUC
MONUSCO
ONUB
ONUCA
ONUMOZ
ONUSAL
UNAMA
UNAMI
UNAMIC
UNAMID
UNAMIR
UNAMSIL
UNAVEM I
UNAVEM II
UNAVEM III
UNCRO
UNDOF
UNFICYP
UNIFIL
UNIIMOG
UNIKOM
UNIOSIL

Fatalities
0
0
0
1
0
4
14
1
5
34
8
3
0
1
0
8
0
0
62
14
17
0
1
6
8
3
0
22
0
1
0

Mission
UNISFA
UNMEE
UNMIBH
UNMIH
UNMIK
UNMIL
UNMIN
UNMIS
UNMISET
UNMISS
UNMIT
UNMOGIP
UNMOP
UNMOT
UNOCI
UNOMIG
UNOMIL
UNOMSIL
UNOMUR
UNOSOM I
UNOSOM II
UNPREDEP
UNPROFOR
UNPSG
UNSMIH
UNSMIS
UNTAC
UNTAES
UNTAET
UNTMIH
UNTSO

Fatalities
2
0
0
2
12
3
0
4
2
9
1
0
0
6
10
8
0
0
0
0
114
0
74
0
0
1
25
2
2
0
2

Notes: The sample includes all missions conducted by the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) from 1990-2013.
Fatalities refer to peacekeepers killed by malicious acts of violence.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Fatality
Fatality Frequency
Coalition Structures
Troops
Police
Observers
P5 Contributors
Regional Contributors
Conflict Severity
Rebel Capacity
Rebel Factions
First Year

N
423
423
421
423
423
423
423
423
423
423
423
423

Mean
0.229
1.149
0.801
28.925
3.822
1.062
2.242
1.709
1.940
0.525
0.739
0.147

Std. Dev.
0.421
5.099
0.179
49.407
8.484
1.496
1.691
2.227
2.819
0.775
1.217
0.354

Min
0.000
0.000
0.206
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Max
1.000
82.000
1.453
346.630
51.345
8.089
5.000
13.167
9.619
3.000
6.000
1.000

Notes: Troops, Police, and Observer variables represent their respective raw values
divided by 100.
Coalition Structures has two fewer observations because the operation to Georgia
(UNOMIG) in 1993 and the operation to Haiti (UNTMIH) in 1998 did not include
coalitions, and therefore did not have variation in organizational structures.
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Table 4.3: Coalition Structures and Likelihood of Peacekeeper Fatalities
Coalition Structures
Troops
Police
Observers
P5 Contributors
Regional Contributors
Rebel Capacity
Rebel Factions
Conflict Severity
First Year
Constant
N
Clusters
Log Likelihood
Chi2
AIC
BIC

Model 1
2.639***
(0.816)
0.019***
(0.005)
-0.019
(0.014)
0.070
(0.108)

Model 2
3.175***
(0.853)
0.022***
(0.004)
-0.016
(0.017)
0.040
(0.118)
0.027
(0.133)
-0.146
(0.091)

Model 3
2.851***
(0.903)
0.024***
(0.004)
-0.022
(0.025)
-0.052
(0.125)
0.087
(0.133)
-0.131
(0.100)
0.364
(0.230)
0.146
(0.213)

Model 4
2.886***
(0.898)
0.024***
(0.004)
-0.022
(0.025)
-0.054
(0.125)
0.088
(0.134)
-0.132
(0.100)
0.388
(0.263)
0.153
(0.253)
-0.009
(0.104)
-0.062
(0.451)
-4.132***
-4.439***
-4.595***
-4.610***
(0.760)
(0.881)
(0.892)
(0.883)
421
421
421
421
62
62
62
62
-179.856
-177.454
-172.256
-172.235
42.082
60.750
72.581
78.677
369.713
368.908
362.512
366.471
389.926
397.206
398.896
410.940

Notes: Logistic regression.
The dependent variable is coded 1 for at least one peacekeeper fatality in a mission-year
and 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors clustered by peacekeeping mission in parentheses.
Smaller values of AIC and BIC indicate better model fit.
Troop, Police, and Observer variables represent a change in 100 personnel respectively.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table 4.4: Coalition Structures and the Number of Peacekeeper Fatalities
Coalition Structures
Troops
Police
Observers
P5 Contributors
Regional Contributors
Rebel Capacity
Rebel Factions
Conflict Severity
First Year
Constant
Alpha
N
Clusters
Log Likelihood
Chi2
AIC
BIC

Model 5
2.443**
(1.054)
0.027***
(0.005)
-0.031
(0.022)
-0.111
(0.101)

Model 6
2.651***
(0.966)
0.028***
(0.005)
-0.018
(0.023)
-0.069
(0.133)
-0.095
(0.158)
-0.051
(0.055)

Model 7
2.951***
(0.899)
0.027***
(0.004)
-0.022
(0.028)
-0.257**
(0.108)
0.104
(0.154)
-0.038
(0.062)
0.411**
(0.184)
0.373**
(0.160)

Model 8
2.938***
(0.919)
0.027***
(0.004)
-0.024
(0.028)
-0.267**
(0.112)
0.112
(0.157)
-0.038
(0.062)
0.395**
(0.182)
0.360**
(0.178)
0.018
(0.069)
-0.135
(0.325)
-3.367***
-3.345***
-4.613***
-4.615***
(1.040)
(1.106)
(0.880)
(0.886)
1.422***
1.404***
1.022***
1.018***
(0.257)
(0.237)
(0.149)
(0.149)
421
421
421
421
62
62
62
62
-389.816
-388.787
-366.838
-366.722
46.959
49.933
103.658
106.530
791.631
793.574
753.676
757.444
815.887
825.915
794.103
805.955

Notes: Negative binomial regression.
The dependent variable is a count of peacekeeper fatalities in each mission-year.
Robust standard errors clustered by peacekeeping mission in parentheses.
Smaller values of AIC and BIC indicate better model fit.
Alpha represents the log-transformed over-dispersion measure. Significant values of this
measure indicate that the negative binomial model is more appropriate than a Poisson
model.
Troop, Police, and Observer variables represent a change in 100 personnel respectively.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
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Figure 4.1: United Nations Peacekeeper Fatalities, 1990-2013

Note: UNOSOM II experienced 82 peacekeeper fatalities in 1993.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Coalition Structures

Notes: The solid line represents a normal distribution.
The dashed line represents the kernel density.
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Figure 4.3: Marginal Effect of Structure on Likelihood of Peacekeeper Fatalities

Notes: Effect represents change in coalition structures with all other variables
held at their mean.
Vertical line represents UNOSOM II coalition structures in 1993.
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Figure 4.4: Marginal Effect of Structure on Number of Peacekeeper Fatalities

Notes: Effect represents change in coalition structures with all other variables
held at their mean.
Vertical line represents UNOSOM II coalition structures in 1993.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This project has focused on characteristics of military organizations and how
these traits influence battlefield efficacy, patterns of alliance formation, and peacekeeper
security. Taken together, this study indicates that the organizational structure of a military
influences its methods of mobilizing and training personnel, development of group
cohesion, and the ability to coordinate actions with other states. Chapter 2 evaluates
organizations at the micro-level and measures structure in terms of personnel
sophistication and bureaucratic design. Chapter 3 disaggregates the concepts of
cooperation and coordination, and characterizes organizations at a macro-level, based on
the share of human and military resources dedicated to the armed forces. Chapter 4
examines the development and maturation of security organizations, and evaluates how
well dissimilar organizations operated in a coalition framework.
The key contribution of this project is that it examines how organizational
characteristics have an effect on how a military functions on and off the battlefield. This
finding challenges existing literature that tends to focus on characteristics of the state,
such as regime type (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Reiter and Stam 2002) and material
resources (Mearsheimer 2001), influence how military organizations perform on the
battlefield. Rather than assuming that military organizations are interchangeable units, I
argue that organizational idiosyncrasies influence the ability of a military to utilize
resources at its disposal and conduct operations effectively against a broad range of
adversaries (Brooks 2007; Tellis 2000). By investigating distinct forms of military
efforts, I not only demonstrate that organizational structure matters, but also that these
characteristics are not sensitive to a particular measure or temporal domain.
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A considerable amount of literature has addressed how differences in material
capabilities, political institutions, and culture can influence state performance in military
efforts, but these studies largely overlook the organizational characteristics of the armed
forces.102 Organizational structure is an important factor because the internal pattern of
relationships, perceptions of authority, and means of communication shape the
fundamental practices and procedures of a given military. Depending on its access to
resources, societal role, and political support, each organization “learns” from its
operational experiences and develops its own set of best practices (Chen 2014; Horowitz
2011; Soeters et al. 2010).103 Accounting for these idiosyncrasies provides a link between
state attributes and variation of outcomes in terms of military efforts. Specifically,
characteristics of military organizations can help explain why some states perform more
effectively on the battlefield, how states select alliance partners, and why large numbers
of peacekeepers often cannot guarantee operational success.
It is also important to recognize how organizational characteristics fit into the
larger international relations literature. Following the assumption that international
system is anarchic, state leaders must create some form of security organization in order
to maintain domestic order and ward off foreign aggressors (Huntington 1957; Feaver
1999; Mearsheimer 2001). The realist/neorealist perspective argues that obtaining and
securing tangible power is paramount, and these actions require a large and capable
fighting force (Mearsheimer 2001). This school of thought assumes that rational actors,
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Some notable exceptions include Biddle 2004 and Millett et al. 1986, 1988.
Organizational learning refers to the ability to gather and disseminate information,
coordinate among units, and provide strong leadership (Fortna and Howard 2008;
Howard 2008).
103
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and the military organizations they create, can use the same set of resources to achieve
identical goals, regardless of perceived differences on the domestic front (Mearsheimer
2001). Conceptualizing states as unitary actors deemphasizes differences among these
entities and “black boxes” each state’s military organization.
The present research challenges this viewpoint by indicating that differing
circumstances influences the structure of a military organization, and in turn, its ability to
convert resources into military assets. Specifically, each state’s armed forces adopt a
unique set of organizational practices and procedures depending on its particular set of
social, political, and economic circumstances. This logic aligns more closely with
neoliberalism, which acknowledges the anarchic system and importance of power, but
also recognizes the influence of subnational and transnational factors to the development
of the state and its institutions (Keohane 2005; Keohane and Martin 1995; Nye 1988).
Moreover, it comports with claims from scholars that military organizations are
microcosms of the societies they serve in terms of professional norms and initiative on
the battlefield (Millet et al. 1986, 1988; Murray 2011; Reiter 2007; Reiter and Stam
2002; Soeters et al. 2010). Nevertheless, while neoliberals recognize the influence of
subnational and transnational factors to the development of state institutions, they do not
address explicitly differences in the armed forces or the impact of these differences.
Another debate between these theoretical perspectives deals with the possibility of
military cooperation among states. From the realist/neorealist perspective, states do not
align with one another unless doing so can favorably shift the distribution of power at the
expense of others or because aggregation of resources is necessary to deter a mutual
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threat (Mearsheimer 2001).104 Because states are unlikely to share genuine interests or
lack incentive to establish a long-term sense of interstate trust, any semblance of
collaboration is little more than a temporary marriage of convenience (Mearsheimer
2001; Waltz 1979). On the other hand, neoliberals argue that the pursuit of one state’s
objectives does not necessarily have to oppose the goals of another (Keohane 2005;
Keohane and Martin 1995). In fact, states can elect to work with others by negotiating
agreements in which each participant plays to its strengths and derives benefits from
others in its areas of relative weakness (Keohane 2005; Keohane and Martin 1995).
Through continued interactions, states develop a familiarity with each other’s capabilities
and interests, which reduces uncertainty among state actors and provides opportunities
for further cooperation in the future (Ikenberry 2000; Keohane 2005).
Both schools of thought present motives and mechanisms for military
collaboration, but these arguments tend to focus on attributes of the state and continue to
“black box” the armed forces. This decision glosses over the fact that military
organizations are distinct entities, and considerable time and effort is required in order for
a multinational force to operate as a cohesive group (Weitsman 2003, 2014). The creation
of a military coalition or alliance offers the benefit of quickly increasing security through
the aggregation of allied resources, but partner organizations must relinquish a degree of
autonomy to reconcile conflicting interests and methods of behavior (Morrow 1993;
Weitsman 2003, 2014). Moreover, military partnerships necessitate coordination of
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Neorealists claim that states are able to balance against potential threats domestically
by increasing material and military capacity (internal balancing) or through the creation
of interstate alignments (external balancing) (Waltz 1979; Morrow 1991; Mearsheimer
2001).
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actions among participating groups in order to experience substantial benefits from the
alignment (Millet et al.1986, 1988; Murray 2011). Therefore, more investigation on the
specific role of military organizations and the influence of organizational characteristics
is necessary if research is to move beyond limitations of current theoretical arguments.
Organizational characteristics also have practical policy implications because they
can influence the likelihood and magnitude of lives lost in conflict. In general, political
leaders are sensitive to battlefield casualties because personnel deaths signal political
ineptitude and threaten a regime’s grip on power (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Dixon
1976; Horowitz et al. 2011; 1996 2002).105 This means that leaders try to adopt policies
that limit personnel losses in order to retain support of the domestic population and keep
positions of authority. While previous works have argued that characteristics of the state,
such as access to material resources and regime type, influence military capabilities, each
chapter of this study focuses on how organizational characteristics affect different
military efforts.
Chapter 2 emphasizes the role of battlefield efficacy, and argues that effective
military organizations minimize their losses and impose relatively high costs on their
adversary. Because most leaders have an incentive to limit personnel losses, I argue that
effective militaries are those that experience fewer casualties than their opponent. To test
this hypothesis, I examine personnel deaths in battles during the First World War. Based
on this specific case, I find military organizations with relatively stratified bureaucracies
and sophisticated personnel operate more effectively on the battlefield and experience

105

Bennett and Stam (1996) argue that democracies fight in shorter wars than other
regime types because democratic leaders fear that public support will wane when the
conflict is prolonged and casualties accumulate.
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fewer casualties as a result. While these results are specific to World War I, this case
helps illustrate the mechanism by which organizational characteristics influence
battlefield performance.
Chapter 3 expands the scope of the theory and applies it to alliance formation. In
this chapter, I argue that political leaders consider elements of cooperation and
coordination when choosing alliance partners. Leaders that align with incompatible
organizations risk losing unnecessary lives in combat because militaries may be unable to
work alongside one another. This means that political leaders recognize the influence of
organizational characteristics, and create alliances strategically with states that share a
similar organizational structure. I examine patterns of alliance formation from 18162007, and find that states are significantly more likely to create alliances with state that
have similar personnel sophistication and societal participation in the military. These
findings indicate that political leaders recognize organizational characteristics and
consider how combining military organizations under an alliance agreement might affect
battlefield efficacy if a crisis were to occur.
Chapter 4 indicates that United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) function
as ad hoc coalitions, and I propose that differences among participating organizations
influence how well peacekeepers can protect themselves from malicious violence.
Because the UN forms PKOs from volunteer forces, an operation’s success hinges on
obtaining and maintaining competent and compatible personnel in the conflict zone.
Nevertheless, political leaders are sensitive to casualties, so states can still withdraw from
the coalition in the face of imminent danger to peacekeeping personnel. I examine PKOs
from 1990-2013 and find that peacekeeping operations composed of personnel from
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similar organizational backgrounds suffer personnel casualties at a significantly lower
likelihood and frequency. These results suggest the United Nations must attempt to
gather as many volunteer forces as possible, but must also consider how organizational
differences among participating militaries will influence their ability to work together in a
coalition framework
The inclusion of organizational characteristics opens up a number of avenues for
additional research. One approach to build on the present study would be to investigate
how domestic political changes alter the roles and responsibilities assigned to the
military. Because the military is one of many state bureaucracies, such changes could
influence personnel sophistication as well as an organization’s capability of adapting new
strategies and technologies.106 Shifting the focus to individual militaries would allow for
more fine-grained measures of organizational characteristics and a more nuanced
examination of how organizations train, mobilize, and utilize their personnel.
Specifically, future studies could examine the bureaucratic hierarchy not just by the
number of ranked positions, but by the number of personnel in respective positions. The
distribution of personnel may not only lead to different relationships among officers and
enlisted soldiers, but may also shape means of communication and discretion by
personnel on the battlefield.
In a related vein, future studies could also examine how organizational traits
influence authority structures within alliances and coalitions. While chapters 3 examines
how political leaders consider the potential for coordination when choosing alliance

106

Horowitz (2011) begins to explore how the organizational age of a military influences
its willingness to adopt new practices.
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partners, this does not explain how states accomplish coordination when called on to fight
together. If state militaries have less difficulty assimilating with other organizations with
similar structures and practices, similar organizations may also be more willing to adopt a
relatively unified command and control structure.107 Conversely, aligned organizations
that have distinct behaviors and standard operating procedures are probably less willing
to sacrifice any autonomy, even to an ally. This means that organizational characteristics
not only affect performance on the battlefield, but also methods of communication and
decision-making within the military partnership. Thus, future research could investigate
cases of multilateral warfare, and identify if and how organizational characteristics
influence the means of command and control adopted by military partners.

Copyright © Michael Andrew Morgan 2015
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Morey (2015) identifies meaningful differences in command and control structures by
classifying multilateral military efforts as coalitions or wars in parallel.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures – Chapter 2
Table 2.1A: Cameron & Trivedi's Decomposition of IM-test (OLS Model 4)

Heteroscedasticity
Skewness
Kurtosis
Total

Chi-Square
35.76
10.54
0.30
46.60

Degrees of Freedom
38
8
1
47

P-Value
0.5736
0.2290
0.5854
0.4892

Note: P-values greater than 0.05 indicate a lack of statistical significance.
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Table 2.2A: Military Organizations and Battlefield Effectiveness (GLM)

Sophistication
Stratification

Model 5
-0.876***
(0.275)
0.334
(0.776)

Model 6
-1.335***
(0.459)
-3.908**
(1.800)

Model 7
-1.124**
(0.439)
-3.301**
(1.662)

-0.097
(0.542)

-0.154
(0.490)
-2.819***
(1.085)
1.544
(0.945)

0.469
(0.573)
102
-48.791
105.581
116.081

3.500***
(1.297)
102
-48.280
108.560
124.310

-0.246
(0.490)
-2.391**
(1.024)
1.302
(0.886)
0.006*
(0.003)
-0.981***
(0.232)
3.021**
(1.221)
102
-47.985
111.969
132.969

Interaction
Military Size
Democracy
Education
Battle Duration
Coalition
Constant
N
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC

Notes: Generalized Linear Model
Logit link function and binomial distribution family
The dependent variable is the loss exchange ratio for each battle-dyad.
Interaction refers to Sophistication x Stratification
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Smaller values of AIC and BIC indicate better model fit.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
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Model 8
-0.901
(1.124)
-3.016
(2.031)
-0.523
(2.528)
-0.254
(0.494)
-2.386**
(1.024)
1.329
(0.895)
0.006**
(0.003)
-0.985***
(0.230)
2.888**
(1.331)
102
-47.983
113.965
137.590

10
5
0

Frequency

15

20

Figure 2.1A: Distribution of Battlefield Casualties

0

.2

.4
.6
Loss Exchange Ratio

Notes: The solid line represents a normal distribution.
The dashed line represents the kernel density.
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Figure 2.2A: Distribution of Personnel Sophistication (Ratio)
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Notes: The solid line represents a normal distribution.
The dashed line represents the kernel density.
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Figure 2.3A: Distribution of Bureaucratic Stratification (Ratio)
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Notes: The solid line represents a normal distribution.
The dashed line represents the kernel density.
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Figure 2.4A: Distribution of Residuals (OLS Model 4)
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Figure 2.5A: Marginal Effect of Sophistication on Battlefield Efficacy (GLM Model 8)

Note: The effect represents change in Sophistication with all other variables
held at their mean.

139

Figure 2.6A: Marginal Effect of Stratification on Battlefield Efficacy (GLM Model 8)

Note: The effect represents change in stratifcation with all other variables
held at their mean.
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Figure 2.7A: Predictive Margins of Interaction Term on Battlefield Efficacy (GLM
Model 8)
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Loss Exchange Ratio
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Predictive Margins
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Stratification=.35
Stratification=.55

Stratification=.45
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Note: Predicted margins are conditional on values of both Sophistication and
Stratification.
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Figure 2.8A: Marginal Effect of Interaction Term on Battlefield Efficacy (GLM Model 8)

Notes: The figure illustrates the predicted LER at different levels of
Sophistication if Stratification is held at 0.5.
The red line identifies a 0.5 share of Loss Exchange Ratio.
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Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures – Chapter 3
Table 3.1A: Participation Difference and Alliance Formation
Participation Difference (ln)
Joint Democracy
Regime Difference
Foreign Policy Similarity
Distance
Major Power
Mutual Threat
Cold War
Time
Time-Squared
Constant
N
Log Likelihood
Chi2
AIC
BIC

All Alliances
-0.101***
(0.015)
-0.710***
(0.083)
-0.049***
(0.005)
3.757***
(0.280)
-0.001***
(0.001)
1.148***
(0.071)
0.643***
(0.107)
0.557***
(0.051)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.001*
(0.001)
-7.661***
(0.277)
528434
-1.12e+04
2457.832
22477.742
22600.697

Defense
-0.081***
(0.019)
-0.475***
(0.086)
-0.050***
(0.005)
3.799***
(0.348)
-0.001***
(0.001)
0.999***
(0.081)
0.600***
(0.120)
0.827***
(0.065)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
-7.994***
(0.340)
528434
-7591.489
2650.860
15204.979
15327.933

Consultation
-0.137***
(0.017)
-0.406***
(0.086)
-0.048***
(0.005)
3.800***
(0.324)
-0.001***
(0.001)
0.912***
(0.079)
0.638***
(0.119)
0.831***
(0.054)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.001)
-8.646***
(0.317)
528434
-8632.283
2604.824
17286.567
17409.521

Notes: Logistic regression.
The dependent variable is coded 1 for an alliance formed in a dyad-year and 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.
Smaller values of AIC and BIC indicate better model fit.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table 3.2A: Military Characteristics and Alliance Formation (Rare Events)
Participation Difference (ln)
Sophistication difference (ln)
Joint Democracy
Regime Difference
Foreign Policy Similarity
Distance
Major Power
Mutual Threat
Cold War
Time
Time-Squared
Constant
N

All Alliances
-0.081***
(0.017)
-0.063***
(0.011)
-0.494***
(0.090)
-0.047***
(0.005)
3.583***
(0.287)
-0.001***
(0.001)
1.095***
(0.077)
0.659***
(0.105)
0.531***
(0.060)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.001**
(0.001)
-7.025***
(0.289)
437894

Defense
-0.058***
(0.021)
-0.041***
(0.014)
-0.233**
(0.096)
-0.045***
(0.006)
3.742***
(0.374)
-0.001***
(0.001)
0.921***
(0.087)
0.627***
(0.122)
0.784***
(0.078)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.001*
(0.001)
-7.536***
(0.368)
437894

Consultation
-0.122***
(0.018)
-0.125***
(0.012)
-0.032
(0.093)
-0.045***
(0.006)
3.503***
(0.328)
-0.001***
(0.001)
0.795***
(0.087)
0.723***
(0.111)
0.879***
(0.065)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.001)
-7.692***
(0.321)
437894

Notes: Rare event logistic regression.
The dependent variable is coded 1 for an alliance formed in a dyad-year and 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table 3.3A: Sophistication Difference and Alliance Formation
Sophistication difference (ln)
Joint Democracy
Regime Difference
Foreign Policy Similarity
Distance
Major Power
Mutual Threat
Cold War
Time
Time-Squared
Constant
N
Log Likelihood
Chi2
AIC
BIC

All Alliances
-0.066***
(0.011)
-0.492***
(0.089)
-0.048***
(0.005)
3.663***
(0.291)
-0.001***
(0.001)
1.066***
(0.078)
0.651***
(0.103)
0.504***
(0.059)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.001**
(0.001)
-6.567***
(0.275)
437900
-9481.762
2121.727
18985.524
19106.411

Defense
-0.043***
(0.014)
-0.233**
(0.095)
-0.046***
(0.006)
3.809***
(0.375)
-0.001***
(0.001)
0.899***
(0.087)
0.618***
(0.120)
0.766***
(0.077)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.001*
(0.001)
-7.219***
(0.356)
437900
-6262.926
2145.688
12547.852
12668.739

Consultation
-0.128***
(0.012)
-0.034
(0.093)
-0.046***
(0.006)
3.631***
(0.333)
-0.001***
(0.001)
0.749***
(0.088)
0.708***
(0.109)
0.836***
(0.064)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.001)
-7.012***
(0.309)
437900
-7063.522
2342.474
14149.043
14269.931

Notes: Logistic regression.
The dependent variable is coded 1 for an alliance formed in a dyad-year and 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.
Smaller values of AIC and BIC indicate better model fit.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table 3.4A: Military Characteristics and Alliance Formation
(Neutrality and Non-Aggression)
Participation Difference (ln)
Sophistication difference (ln)
Joint Democracy
Regime Difference
Foreign Policy Similarity
Distance
Major Power
Mutual Threat
Cold War
Time
Time-Squared
Constant
N
Log Likelihood
Chi2
AIC
BIC

Neutrality Pacts
0.195***
(0.067)
-0.110***
(0.030)
0.012
(0.300)
0.003
(0.015)
1.569***
(0.564)
-0.001***
(0.001)
2.616***
(0.219)
0.796***
(0.256)
0.476**
(0.194)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.001
(0.001)
-7.511***
(0.680)
437894
-1215.051
509.280
2454.102
2585.978

Non-Aggression Pacts
-0.075***
(0.021)
-0.029*
(0.015)
-0.237**
(0.098)
-0.063***
(0.006)
3.619***
(0.389)
-0.001***
(0.001)
0.692***
(0.097)
0.261*
(0.143)
1.152***
(0.091)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.001
(0.001)
-8.071***
(0.366)
437894
-5499.007
2274.354
11022.014
11153.891

Notes: Logistic regression.
The dependent variable is coded 1 for an alliance formed in a dyad-year and 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses.
Smaller values of AIC and BIC indicate better model fit.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed)

146

Figure 3.1A: Defense Pact Alliances, 1816-2007
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Figure 3.2A: Consultation Pact Alliances, 1816-2007
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Appendix C: Additional Tables and Figures – Chapter 4
Table 4.1A: Coalition Structures and Likelihood of Peacekeeper Fatalities
(Rare Event Logistic Regression)
Coalition Structures
Troops
Police
Observers

Model 9
2.601***
(0.807)
0.019***
(0.005)
-0.018
(0.014)
0.067
(0.106)

Model 10
3.104***
(0.839)
0.022***
(0.004)
-0.016
(0.017)
0.033
(0.116)
0.031
(0.131)
-0.138
(0.090)

Model 11
2.765***
(0.884)
0.023***
(0.004)
-0.022
(0.024)
-0.058
(0.123)
0.092
(0.130)
-0.122
(0.097)
0.354
(0.225)
0.144
(0.209)

-4.069***
(0.751)
421
62

-4.353***
(0.867)
421
62

-4.481***
(0.874)
421
62

P5 Contributors
Regional Contributors
Rebel Capacity
Rebel Factions
Conflict Severity
First Year
Constant
N
Clusters

Model 12
2.787***
(0.876)
0.022***
(0.004)
-0.022
(0.024)
-0.061
(0.122)
0.092
(0.130)
-0.121
(0.097)
0.368
(0.256)
0.150
(0.246)
-0.006
(0.102)
-0.045
(0.439)
-4.473***
(0.860)
421
62

Notes: Rare event logistic regression.
The dependent variable is coded 1 for at least one peacekeeper fatality in a mission-year
and 0 otherwise.
Robust standard errors clustered by peacekeeping mission in parentheses.
Troop, Police, and Observer variables represent a change in 100 personnel respectively.
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-tailed)
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Figure 4.1A: Coalition Structures in Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-2013
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Figure 4.2A: First Differences and the Likelihood of Peacekeeper Fatalities

Notes: First differences represent a change from one standard deviation below the
mean to one standard deviation above it.
Variables with a * are discrete, and FD is a change from 0 to 1.
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Figure 4.3A: First Differences and the Number of Peacekeeper Fatalities

Notes: First differences represent a change from one standard deviation below the
mean to one standard deviation above it.
Variables with a * are discrete, and FD is a change from 0 to 1.
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